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eXecuTive summary
This report examines Australia’s experience with transportation public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) and the lessons that experience holds for the use of PPPs in the United States. 
Australia is an important country from which to learn because it has decades of experience 
in PPP use, it has used the approach to deliver billions of dollars of critical transportation 
projects, it has a comparable history to the United States, and a legal system based on 
English common law, which is used in the majority of U.S. states. 
Although the authors explore a range of issues in this report, they focus on four key PPP 
policy issues: (1) how to distribute the risks inherent in PPP contracts across public and 
private sector partners; (2) when and how to use non-compete (or compensation) clauses 
in PPP contracts; (3) how to address concerns about monopoly power; and (4) the role 
and importance of concession length. 
The authors addressed those and other questions by surveying the relevant literature on 
PPP use internationally, and by interviewing numerous Australian PPP experts from the 
public and private sectors, as well as from academia. 
The authors summarize the main findings of this study by listing several “dos” and “don’ts” 
when approaching transportation PPPs in the United States. Some of these findings relate 
directly to the four questions above, while others surfaced during the course of interviews 
as critical issues for consideration. The “dos” include:
Plan for a long-Term Partnership. • Australian experts stress the importance of 
maintaining a long-term working relationship with private partners. They recognize that 
contract closing is not the end of the relationship, but the beginning of a partnership 
that will include both large and small contract renegotiations. Some experts suggested 
that, because of this, fewer details should be specified through ex ante contracting and 
more should be determined through ex post negotiation as conditions evolve. 
recognize that PPPs are important and complex commitments requiring • 
substantial Public sector experience. Public sponsors should appreciate the 
complexity and importance of PPP contracts, and realize that they will be negotiating 
with experienced private partners. Public sponsors should therefore consult with outside 
experts as needed, and vigorously enhance their own expertise. In some Australian 
states, relevant public officials are required to take courses in contract creation and 
administration.
focus on Performance-based contracts. • PPPs can be used to enhance performance 
in project delivery, maintenance and operation. New facilities should be built with 
customers (that is, motorists) in mind. High-quality maintenance and operation should 
be assured through the use of multiple key performance indicators (KPIs) that carry 
financial penalties and rewards.
use concession length strategically. • Australian experts indicate that they are 
comfortable with concession lengths of between 30 and 45 years but (consistent 
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with the earlier point), stress that concession length should not be fixed but rather 
should be viewed as a useful policy tool. It can be a bid variable, and/or can be 
used in renegotiations. If, for example, there is a material adverse effect on private 
partners from a competing facility, then contract length can be extended to provide 
compensation other than cash payouts.
create public “special purpose entities” to deal with initial contractual • 
negotiations. Consistent with the previous point, Australian states often have 
successfully used government-created special purpose entities to conduct the complex 
bidding and contract negotiation process. After contract closing, ongoing administration 
is then turned over to the relevant government authority. Where that authority should 
reside within government is itself the subject of debate.
use material adverse effect clauses (or “non-compete clauses” in u.s. • 
terminology) in conjunction with “compensable enhancement” provisions. 
A material adverse effect (MAE) clause typically includes a provision granting the 
concessionaire compensation if an unplanned competing facility reduces its traffic 
flows, and thus revenues. A compensable enhancement provision is essentially the 
opposite of an MAE clause in that the public sector shares in revenues generated by 
new facilities that increase traffic on the PPP facility. Since the installation of a new 
nearby facility can obviously either increase or decrease flows on the PPP facility, both 
clause types should be included.
Important “don’ts” include:
if congestion pricing may be used in the future, don’t become locked into a set • 
of long-term PPP contracts that do not accommodate such pricing, particularly 
if those PPPs interact in a network setting. If system-wide variable congestion 
pricing is envisioned for the future, it is important that long-term PPP contracts allow 
for its implementation. This is particularly important if there is a set of PPPs in or 
around one urban area, so that pricing on one PPP may affect traffic on another. This 
is an emerging concern in Sydney. 
Don’t fail to “bring the public along” through public relations efforts that explain • 
PPP contracts, its benefits to the public, and its progress. Failure to conduct 
effective public relations activities led to widespread public misunderstanding of some 
Australian PPP projects, while other efforts, particularly at PPP openings, were very 
successful.
Don’t withhold details of PPP contracts from the public unless disclosure would • 
harm the competitive process. Some details of Australian PPP contracts in New 
South Wales have been withheld from the public using “commercial in confidence” 
provisions. This appears to have increased public skepticism about PPPs. Consistent 
with conducting effective relations with the public, project sponsors should encourage 
the maximum degree of transparency consistent with a competitive bidding process. 
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focus on outcomes for customers, not inputs. • Numerous interviewees stressed 
that an important benefit of private sector participation lies in its ability to innovate, 
and that this is also true in project design and delivery (as well as in operation and 
expansion). Public sponsors should thus specify the outcomes they hope the project 
delivers, and allow private bidders to deliver those outcomes in an innovative way.
Don’t attempt to maximize up-front concession fee payments on greenfield • 
projects. In some early Australian transport PPPs, state governments structured 
bidding to receive large up-front payments on new concessions. Although up-front 
payments may generate social benefits by allowing other transport projects to proceed, 
they were viewed skeptically by the public, which believed they came at the expense 
of higher tolls. 
The authors discuss these and other policy considerations further in the body of the 
report. 
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inTroDucTion
“Public-private partnership” has become a catch-all term for a range of contractual 
agreements between a public sector project sponsor and private sector partners who are 
able to provide the design and construction of a new transportation facility, or the operation, 
renovation, and expansion of an existing facility. Formal PPP definitions are notable for 
their breadth. A report by Australia’s State of Victoria defining PPPs stresses regulation 
by contract: “This report uses public private partnership (PPP) to designate a relationship 
between a government party and a private party to deliver public infrastructure or facilities 
and any related ancillary services. The relationship is regulated by a contract that allocates 
responsibilities, rights, risks and rewards between the parties.”1 International definitions 
are similar. A U.S. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) study of transportation PPPs in 
the international context emphasizes the role of the private sector in project financing: “For 
the purposes of this paper, a public-private partnership is defined as a contract between 
the public and private sectors for the delivery of a project or service in which the private 
partner has responsibility for acquiring the majority of the necessary financing.”2 Certainly 
one of the most notable aspects of PPPs is that, by allowing equity participation, they 
facilitate the flow of capital into transportation infrastructure and thus risk bearing.
PPPs are notable for the wide variety of services they can help provide. They range from 
such major responsibilities as private partners designing, financing, building, operating, 
and/or managing a major transportation facility to the concession of a highway rest stop.3 
PPPs are also increasingly being used to construct the range of facilities falling under 
the broad term of “social infrastructure,” which includes schools, hospitals, prisons and 
desalination plants, among many others. 
Because of the vast array of services potentially provided via a PPP, it is important 
to focus the discussion. In this study, the authors stress private investment in surface 
transportation infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and tunnels. The basic approach 
discussed here, however, can be applied easily to other transportation facilities, such as 
ports and intermodal connectors. 
Fiscal necessity was an important motivation in many countries, including Australia. Public 
officials sought new funding sources due to tight governmental budget constraints and, 
in some cases, a desire to move financing off public sector balance sheets.4 However, 
many governments have retained, refined, and expanded their PPP programs over time.5 
Their analysis of and policies toward PPPs have consequently improved. In addition to 
raising capital, common reasons for retaining PPP programs include the ability to transfer 
important risks to the private sector (such as revenue or traffic risk, and construction-
related risks), incentives for life-cycle facility management (which simply means applying 
the best management practices and a concern about costs over the life of the facility, rather 
than just in the present time period; also called life-cycle costing), enhanced innovation in 
both design and operation, greater competition in service provision, accelerated project 
delivery, and specialized expertise in designing and constructing new facilities. Australian 
states have pursued PPPs for similar reasons under the broad rubric of providing better 
“value for money” for citizens.6 If poorly implemented, however, PPPs can result in large 
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net social costs. Potential costs stem from greater exploitation of monopoly power, high 
contracting costs, and lack of transparency. 
The purpose of this report is to examine the lessons that Australia’s PPP experience 
holds for the United States. The authors hope that such a study will reduce the social 
costs potentially created by PPPs. Their goal is to distill the practices that have worked 
well in Australia, and which may be transferable to the United States, as well as to identify 
those best avoided. The research design was to first examine lessons offered by the 
current relevant literature on PPPs. The authors then examined four policy issues that 
have been prominent in the United States (1) how to distribute the risks inherent in PPP 
contracts across public and private sector partners; (2) when to use non-compete (or 
compensation) clauses in PPP contracts; (3) how to address concerns about monopoly 
power; and (4) the role and importance of concession length.
The authors then interviewed a number of Australian PPP experts, mostly by phone 
(although several were interviewed in person), about those four issues, as well as other 
questions that have arisen when transport PPPs were used in Australia. 
Interviewees were chosen for their expertise in transport PPPs, as well as for their 
diversity across regions and backgrounds. The list of interviewees is reported in Appendix 
B. The interviews were intended to be relatively open and free-ranging to afford maximum 
learning. However, there was a pre-determined list of questions for interviewees that the 
authors hoped to touch on in each case. The list of questions is reported in Appendix C. To 
encourage candid discussions with interviewees, the authors maintain the confidentiality 
of responses throughout, and thus refer only to “interviewees” and “experts” in the text. 
The authors believe that this approach was successful in eliciting candid responses. 
Because a number of points were identified in the interviews that extend beyond the four 
core issues, the report includes a separate section focusing on topics in addition to those 
four. 
 
The report proceeds as follows: The authors first describe a number of standard types 
of PPP contracts to give the reader a better sense of how they work in practice. They 
then show why Australia provides an appropriate setting for distilling valuable transport 
PPP lessons. While doing so, the authors offer general background information on the 
motive and structure of Australia’s transport PPPs. They then show why policy lessons 
surrounding transport PPPs are critical for the United States today, providing an overview 
of current U.S. transport policy, and offering some examples of U.S. PPPs. They follow 
with a broad survey of the burgeoning literature on PPPs. This review is by necessity 
partial because PPP literature—even that specific to transport—is now so large that a 
complete survey of it is beyond the scope of this report.
The authors then turn to discussion of the four central policy issues. In each case, they 
define the issue and show why it was chosen, and why it is important. They note how the 
issue has been treated in the United States, and then discuss its treatment in Australia. 
The authors then follow with a section cataloging several additional policy issues identified 
as a result of their interviews with Australian PPP experts.
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Notably, the FHWA 2009 scanning study entitled Public-Private Partnerships for Highway 
Infrastructure: Capitalizing on International Experience appeared during the preparation of 
this report.7 To the extent that it identifies lessons for the United States from international 
experience, that study has much the same objectives as this study. The authors view its 
publication as independent confirmation of the value of their endeavor. The FHWA study, 
however, examines four countries: Australia, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
It should thus be viewed as providing more breadth across countries, while this study 
provides more depth into a single country’s experience. The authors report the FHWA’s 
views and use their analysis as a point of departure wherever appropriate. The study 
concludes by summarizing its key policy insights, as well as highlighting differences in best 
practices between the United States and Australia. 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
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TyPes of PPP conTracTs
The authors next provide a sense of how transport PPP contracts work by describing 
several standard types. This list is incomplete, but serves to illustrate the inherent flexibility 
of the PPP contracting approach. Roughly speaking, moving from the least amount of 
private responsibility to the greatest, some common contractual categories include the 
following seven:8 
Design-bid-build (DBB) was the traditional contractual approach used to construct 1. 
many public works in the United States in the twentieth century. Under a DBB contract 
the public sector engages engineers and architects to design a facility to meet certain 
specifications. It then accepts bids from pre-certified construction firms to build the 
facility. Notably, the design and construction firms in a DBB contract are separately 
responsible for each of those project stages. The government is responsible for 
financing the project and assumes all risks associated with its ownership and operation. 
The facility remains under government management for its entire design life. Private 
financing and risk assumption are minimal in a DBB contract.
A design-build (DB) contract is a straightforward extension of a DBB contract. Under 2. 
a DB approach, a single private partner designs and constructs a facility, in contrast 
to the separation of those responsibilities in a DBB contract. A DB contract has the 
advantage of capturing any economies of information, knowledge, and skill between 
a facility’s design and its construction. Like DBB contracts, DB contracts usually do 
not involve private financing, but private parties do assume additional risk through the 
design and construction process.
The design-build-operate-maintain (DBOM) approach allows parties to benefit from 3. 
additional process integration relative to a DB contract. Under a DBOM arrangement, the 
private partner is responsible for the design, construction, operation, and maintenance 
of a facility for a specific time period. Operation and maintenance functions are therefore 
added to the private partner’s responsibilities relative to a DB contract. Payment after 
project completion is conditional on meeting certain performance standards, such 
as physical condition, traffic congestion, ride quality, and capacity. A DBOM contract 
allows the private partner to utilize its detailed knowledge of a particular facility’s design 
and construction to develop a maintenance and operating plan specific to that facility. 
By assigning responsibility to the private partner for project quality and performance 
throughout its entire lifecycle, this approach also gives the contract team incentive to 
provide the best possible plan and project. If, for example, heavy vehicles are going to 
use a highway, then a private firm that builds and then maintains the facility will use more 
durable pavement.9 The government typically retains ownership and is responsible for 
financing the project under a DBOM contract. 
Long-term lease (LTL) agreements allow the competitively chosen private partner to 4. 
lease an existing toll facility for an extended time period through a bidding process. 
The contract details the responsibilities of the private partner regarding maintenance, 
operation, improvement, and expansion of the facility in return for the right to the facility’s 
toll revenue. The private partner typically pays an upfront concession fee, although 
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other approaches, such as revenue sharing or annual lease payments, are possible. 
Ownership again remains with the government, but private investors usually assume 
risks—such as revenue risk from changes in traffic flow, as well as risks associated 
with changes in operation, maintenance, and renovation costs. In the United States, 
the Indiana Toll Road and the Chicago Skyway concession agreements are examples 
of long-term leases.
A design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) contract is an extension of the DBOM approach 5. 
in that the private partner assumes at least some added responsibility for financing 
the project and the risks associated with that financing—that is, the private partner 
becomes responsible for the design, construction, financing, operation, maintenance, 
improvement, and expansion of a new facility. The partner is granted the right to actual 
toll revenue (or shadow toll payments) for a specified time period in exchange for 
fulfilling those responsibilities. Although DBFO contracts vary according to the degree 
of private financing involved, part of the financing is usually accomplished through 
debt that leverages streams of toll revenue. A DBFO contract may be awarded for 
the upgrading or expansion of an existing facility if the necessary renovations are 
significant. In many cases, operational responsibility reverts to the government after a 
period of time. This appears to be a popular approach internationally.
Under a build-operate-transfer/build-transfer-operate (BOT/BTO) contracting 6. 
approach, the private partner designs, constructs, finances, and operates the facility 
as under a DBFO contract. The private partner owns the facility, however, until the end 
of the construction period or the contract term. Ownership reverts to the public-sector 
sponsor at the end of the agreed-upon period. In Australia, for example, facilities have 
often been built and operated under a build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) approach.
A build-own-operate (BOO) contract engages the competitively chosen private partner 7. 
in a broad range of responsibilities, including the design, financing, construction, 
ownership, maintenance, and operation of a transportation facility. Because the private 
partner actually owns the facility, it assumes all risks associated with the facility’s 
ownership and operation. Although there is typically no provision for transferring facility 
ownership to the government, the terms of the concession may be renegotiated, or the 
government may purchase the facility.
An additional noteworthy PPP distinction is between real toll, shadow toll, and availability 
payments arrangements. Real toll arrangements involve charging drivers directly for road 
use. The motorist actually pays the toll. Shadow tolls differ in that the motorist does not 
pay a toll directly. Payments are instead made by the public sector to a private road 
operator based partly on the number of vehicles using the road. Availability payments are 
similar to shadow tolls in that the private partner does not receive toll revenue directly. The 
public partner’s payment is here not based on traffic volume, but rather on the basis of 
other dimensions of service quality, including such factors as safety, congestion, minimum 
performance criteria, and lane availability (hence the name).10 Depending on the details 
of their structure, such non-toll arrangements allow public and private partners to share 
traffic (or demand) risk. They also allow performance-based PPPs to be used on un-tolled 
roads. This means that, even if political or other considerations prevent tolling, a PPP 
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may still be used. Each type of arrangement carries its own set of costs and benefits, and 
provides public sponsors with additional policy choices. 
In the United States, a distinction has also been made between two broad categories of 
transport PPPs: greenfield and brownfield agreements. In a greenfield PPP, the private 
partners are responsible for the financing, design, construction, operation, maintenance 
and expansion of a new facility. Brownfield projects involve leasing of an existing tolled 
facility by a private partner.11 The partner is typically responsible for maintaining, operating, 
refurbishing and upgrading the facility in return for the right to collect toll revenue. 
Although there have only been four, brownfield PPPs in the United States have been more 
controversial than greenfield projects. 
The issues discussed in this report relate most directly to greenfield PPPs, since Australia 
has only built new facilities using the PPP approach. However, Australia is now confronting 
similar issues as those raised by brownfields in the United States. Some Australian PPPs 
have encountered financial difficulties, and a decision must be made regarding whether 
or not to find new operating partners. Also, when a concession expires, the relevant state 
government must decide if there will be a new concession, which is effectively a brownfield 
PPP.12 The next chapter discusses why Australia provides an appropriate setting for the 
study of transport PPPs.
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Why ausTralia?
 
There are several reasons why Australia provides an excellent setting for in-depth study 
of transportation PPPs. First, Australia has extensive experience, in terms of both time 
and number, with PPPs relative to the United States.13  Australia’s experience with PPPs 
is usually dated from 1985, when discussions began with private partners to build the 
Sydney Harbour Tunnel. Australia’s use of PPPs accelerated in the 1990s. Until the early 
1990s, most of Australia’s public infrastructure was financed through current tax revenue 
or government borrowing. Budget pressures in the early 1990s combined with the need 
to deliver large, increasingly complex infrastructure projects to meet rapid urban growth, 
motivated Australia to turn to the private sector for the design, financing, construction and 
management of transportation projects.14  Over time, the PPP approach became accepted 
as a legitimate procurement method. By 2005, all territorial and state governments, as well 
as the Commonwealth Government, had embraced the PPP concept. A 2005 study listed 
almost 90 Australian PPP projects across a range of economic activities, either under 
construction, completed or proposed.15  The Australian PPP program has moved forward 
rapidly since then.
Second, Australia is the world’s largest, and perhaps its most experienced, infrastructure 
investor. Australian superannuation (or pension) funds have been an important driving 
force in infrastructure investing, with approximately 5 percent of assets actually invested 
in infrastructure on average. Some funds have invested significantly more.16 Many were 
set up in the mid-1990s, so Australian managers now have substantial experience in 
infrastructure investing. U.S. pension funds were some of the earliest investors in those 
infrastructure funds.17 According to one survey, Macquarie Group is the largest fund 
manager, with assets of over $20 billion and a market share of 44 percent.18 
Third, Australian banks and operating companies are large investors in U.S. transportation 
infrastructure. The Australian company Transurban, for example, is partnering with Fluor 
in the Washington DC Beltway HOT Lanes construction project. Transurban also has a 
substantial interest in the Pocahontas 895 PPP project in Virginia and is negotiating a HOT 
lanes project on I-95 between Washington DC and Richmond with the Virginia Department 
of Transportation. Moreover, in 2004 the Sydney-based Macquarie Infrastructure Group 
partnered with the Spanish firm Cintra to complete the Chicago Skyway lease agreement. 
Australian domestic PPP policy may therefore be of particular interest in the United 
States. 
Fourth, Australia has a legal system similar to the majority of U.S. states.19 Law in both 
Australia and the United States evolved out of English common law, so similar traditions 
with respect to property rights and contract enforcement obtain, both of which are critical 
for successful PPPs. Moreover, Australia and the United States share the same language 
and similar cultures, because of their backgrounds as British colonies. Because of their 
similar language, legal, and cultural background, lessons from Australia’s PPP experience 
may be more readily applicable to the United States than those of some other nations.
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Finally, transportation plays a particularly important role in Australia’s economy. Australia’s 
extensive transport systems include railroad networks, roadways, shipping and airlines. 
Those systems support the movement of people and goods around an extraordinarily 
large land mass. In 2006–2007, the national total freight load was 507 billion ton-
kilometers, and total passenger travel amounted to about 367 billion passenger kilometers. 
Transportation also accounts for a considerable fraction of Australia’s overall economic 
activity. Transportation-related industries represented 4.7 percent of its gross domestic 
product (GDP) and 4.7 percent of its total employment in 2007–2008.20 Australia’s road 
and highway system is also extensive relative to its population. In 2004 there were 341,448 
kilometers of paved roads in Australia, or about 17 kilometers per person. This is almost 
20 percent more than the 14.2 kilometers per person in the United States in that year.21 
The following chapter provides more detail on the use of transport PPPs in Australia.
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Public-PrivaTe ParTnershiPs in ausTralia
 
Australian transport PPPs are typically undertaken at the state level. The states with the 
greatest use of PPPs are New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland. Each state has a 
different history of PPP use and a different approach, which allows comparisons across 
states. Australia imported many ideas and concepts about implementing PPPs from the 
U.K.’s private finance initiative (PFI) in the early 1990s.22 States have refined their approach 
and adapted it to their needs over time. 
Although they still account for a relatively modest amount of overall infrastructure 
investment in Australia, PPPs are now used in some of the most complex and dense 
urban transportation settings. Indeed, Australia today has not only contractually closed 
but has under construction some of the largest highway PPP agreements in the world.23 
The Australian Government’s Productivity Commission pegs the overall fraction of public 
infrastructure provided by PPPs at about 5 percent, and notes the growth in PPP use over 
time.24 
Commentators in Australia often make a distinction between economic and social 
infrastructure. Economic infrastructure is sometimes defined by heavy reliance on user 
fees to fund the project, with the private sector assuming demand or revenue risk. 25 The 
government of New South Wales, for example, states that the:
Typical characteristics of economic infrastructure are:
Private revenues are derived from third party users• 
The private provider faces market/demand risk• 
Traditionally delivered through a government business enterprise (including a state-• 
owned corporation)
Revenue risks are a key driver of financial outcomes• 26
Social infrastructure involves facilities that are typically not funded on a user-pay basis, 
but where the basic required infrastructure is nevertheless procured through a public-
private partnership. Such infrastructure includes facilities like hospitals, schools, prisons, 
courthouses, and public housing. The Australian state of New South Wales (which includes 
Sydney) has in recent years procured the following diverse array of social and economic 
infrastructure projects using the PPP approach:
Motorways• 
Heavy and light rail• 
Housing• 
Health care • 
Prisons• 
Energy projects• 
Olympic infrastructure• 
Landfill waste facilities• 
Water treatment plants• 
Waste water recycling facilities• 
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Overall, between 2000 and 2006, Australia contracted for 39 PPP projects totaling almost 
$17 billion.27 Tollways have been one of the most dynamic components of those projects, 
with 11 toll roads delivered since the 1980s, equivalent to investment of about $12 billion. 
Table 1 below displays the number and total value of PPP infrastructure projects by 
state.28 Although social infrastructure projects are typically more numerous, economic 
infrastructure accounts for the greatest overall value of PPP projects. Table 1 shows how 
projects have been concentrated in a few states.
 PPP infrastructure investment in australia, 2000 to 2006Table 1
Government No. of PPP Projects Value of PPP Projects (Aus$m)
Commonwealth Government   2     706
New South Wales 15  8,000
Victoria 16  4,500
Queensland   2  2,500
Western Australia   1     200
South Australia   1       40
Tasmania   1         0
ACT   0         0
Northern Territory   1      600
Total 39 16,636
Source: Australian Government, Productivity Commission, Public Infrastructure Financing: An International 
Perspective (March 2009), Table 8.2, p. 156.
There are several reasons why Australian states are expanding the use of the PPP approach. 
Commentators stress the benefit of bringing projects forward that would otherwise languish 
for years or decades waiting for public funding. They also note the advantage of being 
able to transfer some of the risks inherent in facility design, construction and operation 
to private partners. Third, experts stress how PPP use has assisted in the development 
of robust domestic design, construction, financing and operating industries. Summarizing 
these points, the Australian Government’s Productivity Commission states:
Public-private partnerships constitute around 5 percent of investment in public
infrastructure, more in New South Wales and Victoria which have been the main
users of this financing vehicle. This growth is due in large part to the scope to 
bring in private sector management skills, the opportunity that bundling design, 
construction and operation, or parts thereof, provide to improve efficiency and the 
ability to bring forward the provision of infrastructure service.... 
The potential to lower total costs through alignment of incentives to manage 
project risk with capacity to do so is considerable. Contract design and 
management are important to ensure that only risks that can be better managed 
by the private sector partner are allocated to them. PPP use in Australia has 
also fostered the development of a large domestic infrastructure investment, 
construction, and facility operation industry.29
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Similarly, the FHWA study emphasized the use of PPPs to bring projects forward and help 
develop the domestic industry to support them: 
Australian states have used highway PPPs selectively in their urban centers to
implement large-scale surface mobility improvements in a relatively short 
timeframe.  These highways have improved both commuter and freight travel in 
the most densely populated cities in Australia—Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane. 
Similar to Spain, the activity in Australia has spawned an industry of highway 
developers, operators, and financiers. These private firms are also positioned to 
provide their services across the globe.30
Ths study discusses the use of PPPs in Australia at the state level in more detail in 
Appendix D, where the authors describe programs and projects in New South Wales, 
Victoria, and Queensland. In the next chapter, they explain why transport PPPs are of 
particular importance in the United States.
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TransPorTaTion Public-PrivaTe ParTnershiPs
in The uniTeD sTaTes
A confluence of powerful forces in the United States is encouraging states and localities 
to consider a greater private sector role in the financing, construction, operation, and 
maintenance of transportation facilities such as highways, bridges, tunnels, ports, and 
inter-modal connectors. Mirroring Australia in an earlier period, severe state and local 
budgetary constraints driven by weak tax revenues are also a factor. Those budgetary 
problems are combined with reluctance to raise fuel taxes at either the state or federal 
level. The purchasing power of fuel tax revenue has also been declining due to inflation. 
Fuel tax revenue declines are exacerbated by increasing vehicle efficiency and the use of 
alternative fuels, both of which are encouraged by federal transportation policy. 
Meanwhile, large sections of state roads, arterials, and the U.S. interstate highway system 
itself, have reached the end of their original design lives and are in need of major renovation 
and expansion. In many places, too few lane-miles have been added to keep pace with 
the demand for transportation services, which manifests itself through congestion and 
overloaded transportation systems.31 
Together those forces have created a massive “infrastructure-financing gap in the United 
States.” The gap is defined as the difference between financing needs and the capital 
available to fund those needs. In a 2009 report, the National Surface Transportation 
Infrastructure Financing Commission pegged the nation’s average annual transportation 
financing gap at $172 billion per year (U.S.) to maintain the existing system and $214 
billion to improve it, while the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study 
Commission pegged the gap at $194 billion (U.S.) annually to maintain and $262 billion 
to improve.32 Current sources of financing are insufficient to address the gap, and there 
is a consensus that innovative sources of financing, including private capital, must be 
accessed to help close it. 
The wide availability of private capital is also a factor. The interest of global investors, 
including pension funds and insurance companies, in infrastructure investment continues 
to grow, making large pools of investment capital and expertise available for U.S. transport 
projects.33 This is especially true after the global financial crisis as investors search for 
stable returns in investments they can actually touch. The history of successful private 
investment in other network industries in the United States, such as railroads, electricity, 
and natural gas, is also likely to make U.S. governmental entities more sympathetic to 
private participation. 
Several U.S. transport PPP projects are described in this chapter. They help to illustrate 
the variety of contractual arrangements used in the United States. As noted, an important 
distinction is between brownfield concessions and greenfield projects. In a greenfield, a 
PPP is used to design, build, finance, and then operate a new facility. The authors provide 
examples of both below.
california 91 express lanes. The 91 Express Lanes combine a 10-mile, high-occupancy 
toll road with a full tollway lying completely within the median of State Route 91 (the 
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Riverside Freeway) in California. Opened in 1995, the express lanes are separated from 
the regular SR 91 lanes by a three-foot wide pavement section where the boundary is 
marked by yellow plastic pylons. There are no tollbooths on the lanes, and all tolls are 
collected electronically using FasTrak transponders. To help manage congestion, the toll 
lanes use time-of-day pricing (as opposed to real-time, variable tolling).
The project was developed through a partnership between the California Department of 
Transportation (Caltrans) and the California Private Transportation Company (CPTC). In 
April 2002, the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) agreed to purchase the 
lanes for $207.5 million, and it took possession in January 2003. The lanes are managed 
and operated by Cofiroute USA, which is one of the primary investors in the project.34 
The 91 Express Lanes are notable for several “firsts.” In explaining their decision to 
assign the 1996 Excellence in Highway Design award to the 91 Express Lanes, the 
U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration stated that “Ninety-
One Express Lanes is the world’s first automated toll road; the first implementation of 
congestion pricing on a U.S. toll facility; and the first toll road to be privately financed in 
the U.S. in more than 50 years.”35 
The 91 Express Lanes were controversial because of a non-compete clause in the PPP 
agreement. Non-compete clauses are designed to prevent loss of revenue due to competing 
unplanned free roads, and are common to both publicly and privately financed roads. The 
clause precluded construction by the state of competing facilities along thirty miles of the 
Riverside Freeway. CPTC filed a lawsuit against Caltrans when the state widened parts of 
the freeway.36 Although the lawsuit was dismissed after OCTA purchased the facility, the 
controversy caused changes in the nature of many non-compete agreements. 
chicago skyway. The Chicago Skyway concession is an example of a long-term leasing, 
or brownfield, PPP contract. The skyway is a 7.8-mile toll road that is part of the I-90 
interstate highway. It connects the Dan Ryan Expressway (which carries both I-90 and 
I-94 route numbers) in Chicago to the Indiana Toll Road (I-90). A 3.5-mile section of the 
skyway is elevated, allowing it to cross the Calumet River. The skyway carried about 
50,000 vehicles per day in 2005.37 
The City of Chicago issued a request for qualifications in March of 2004 from bidders 
interested in leasing the skyway for a 99-year term. The city received ten responses, 
and five bidders were asked to submit detailed proposals. The high bid of $1.83 billion 
came from a partnership of Cintra Concesiones de Infraestructuras de Transporte S.A. 
(Cintra) of Madrid, Spain, and Macquarie Infrastructure Group of Sydney, Australia, which 
cooperated to create the Skyway Concession Company LLC (SCC). The city awarded the 
contract to SCC in the first modern long-term lease of an existing U.S. toll road.38 
The Skyway Concession Company has the right to all concession and toll revenues. Toll 
increases are capped at 2 percent per annum, the rise in the Consumer Price Index, or 
the increase in U.S. gross domestic product per capita, whichever is greatest. The $1.83 
billion upfront payment was equivalent to an impressive 70 percent of the city’s annual 
budget.39 Although the advantages of PPPs do not stem from the way in which public 
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sponsors decide to use concession proceeds, it is nevertheless instructive to examine how 
they were used here. Of the $1.83 billion, $825 million was used to pay off both outstanding 
skyway and city debt, $500 million went to creating a reserve fund that will produce about 
$25 million annually for the city, $325 million was invested in an annuity, and $100 million 
went to a variety of projects, such as homeless shelters, facilities for senior citizens, and 
libraries.40 Moody’s Investor Service upgraded Chicago’s bond rating as a result of its 
improved fiscal position to the highest level in twenty-five years.41
Importantly, by revealing the true market value of the facility, this brownfield PPP allowed 
the citizens of Chicago to know and consider the rate of return they were earning as 
owners of the skyway under city management. Given the income and expenses of the 
skyway and the $1.83 billion market value of the concession as revealed through the 
bidding process, citizen-owners were receiving an abysmal 0.4 percent return on their 
investment.42 Taxpayers were therefore much better off paying down debt, which carried 
an interest rate of about 5 percent—over twelve times what they were earning prior to 
the lease.43 The private partner improved the operation of the road—by quickly adopting 
electronic tolling, for example—and the lease was widely viewed as a success.
Denver northwest Parkway. The Northwest Parkway is a 9-mile toll road outside of 
Denver, Colorado, forming a portion of the (incomplete) Denver beltway. Construction 
on the parkway began in June 2001, and it opened to traffic on November 24, 2003. 
The parkway struggled financially its first few years. In November 2007, the Northwest 
Parkway Public Highway Authority entered into a concession and lease agreement for 
its operation and maintenance with the Northwest Parkway LLC, a joint venture between 
the Portuguese firm Brisa Auto-Estradas S.A. (known simply as Brisa) and the Brazilian 
firm Companhia de Concessões Rodoviárias (CCR). This arrangement was unusual, and 
laudable, in that a toll authority itself leased responsibility for its operations.
Brisa and CCR paid €603 million for the concession rights. The Parkway Authority will 
use the proceeds to pay off remaining construction financing debts, provide funding for a 
2.3-mile extension of the toll road connecting to state Highway 28 in Broomfield, and put 
funds into an escrow account to provide incentive payments for local jurisdictions.44 These 
payments will be used to mitigate local opposition to the completion of the missing portion 
of the overall Denver beltway. 
Dulles greenway. The Dulles Greenway is a 14-mile, limited-access highway outside of 
Washington DC. It extends from the state-owned Dulles Toll Road, which connects the 
Washington DC beltway to Dulles Airport, to Leesburg, Virginia, and it opened to traffic in 
September 1995.
The Dulles Greenway offers an interesting case study of the versatility of private investment 
arrangements. Its structure does not fit into standard modern PPP categories and may 
instead be best described as a modern example of a facility built under a nineteenth-
century toll road charter. Indeed, its website notes that “the Dulles Greenway is one of the 
first highways of its kind in the United States, and is the first private road in Virginia since 
1816.” 45
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The greenway was built under the Virginia Highway Act of 1988. Interestingly, the 1988 
act did not grant the investors—the Toll Road Investors Partnership II (TRIP II)—the 
power of eminent domain. Rather, the assemblage of private lands required to build the 
greenway was purchased at market price.46 Dulles Greenway regulation is also unusual. 
The greenway is regulated by the Virginia State Corporation Commission, which limits 
its rate of return to 18 percent, which is consistent with utility-style regulation. Unlike with 
standard utility regulation, however, the greenway receives no legally enforced monopoly 
through an exclusive territory. It continues to pay real estate taxes on property purchased 
to build the road, thus generating more tax revenue than a traditional project delivery 
approach.47 
The greenway was financed at a cost of $350 million by TRIP II, with $40 million in equity 
and $310 million in privately placed taxable debt. Ten institutional investors held most of 
the debt. In the original agreement, operational responsibilities were to revert to Virginia 
after 42.5 years. The greenway faced financial challenges in its early years, however. TRIP 
II restructured its debt in 1999, and the Virginia State Corporation Commission extended 
the concession length by 20 years to 2056.48 Tolls were increased in September 2004, 
and different peak and discounted off-peak rates were allowed. TRIP II sought regulatory 
approval for more variably priced tolls in July 2006, consistent with a congestion-pricing 
approach. The change in contract length suggests how this variable can be adjusted to 
account for differing financial conditions.
TRIP II was purchased by the Macquarie Infrastructure Group in August 2005 for $617.5 
million, and is now a fully owned subsidiary of Macquarie. The road is, however, operated 
by Autostrade International, which is a subsidiary of the largest toll road operator in the 
world, Italian-based Autostrade S.p.A.49
indiana Toll road. The Indiana Toll Road is another example of a brownfield long-term 
leasing arrangement. In operation since 1956, the 157-mile Indiana Toll Road runs along 
the northernmost border of Indiana. The toll road is an important transportation facility 
in a broader sense, linking large cities on the eastern seaboard with those on the Great 
Lakes.50 
The Indiana Department of Transportation operated the toll road for many years. In 2005, 
the State of Indiana issued a request for proposals for a 75-year lease and received 
four. The winning offer was for $3.8 billion from the Indiana Toll Road Concession 
Company (ITRCC), which again is a joint venture between Cintra and Macquarie.51 The 
concession agreement placed limits on toll increases and on the concessionaire’s return 
on investment. The state used the proceeds to fund a ten-year transportation plan known 
as “Major Moves,” which will support about two hundred transportation projects around 
the state. As a result, Indiana is the only U.S. state with a fully funded transportation plan 
for the years 2006 to 2015.52 Major Moves will result in a quadrupling of highway spending 
in Indiana, from $213 million in 2006 to $874 million in 2015. As in Chicago, the brownfield 
concession resulted in an upgrade of Indiana’s debt rating by Standard & Poor’s to AAA, 
its best rating ever. The improved debt rating will save the state millions of dollars in 
interest payments over time.
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i-495/Washington Dc, beltway hoT lanes. The Washington DC, region generally 
and the Northern Virginia area in particular are among the fastest growing areas in the 
country. The amount of traffic using the Capital Beltway overall has tripled since it was last 
expanded in 1997, and congestion costs the local economy almost $5.5 billion per year.53 
Unsurprisingly, the Northern Virginia portion of the Washington DC–Capital Beltway is one 
of the most congested traffic routes in the eastern United States. 
Assistance is coming in the form of 14 miles of high-occupancy toll (HOT) lanes to be 
added to the Northern Virginia portion of the beltway, the first major expansion in over 
30 years. HOT lanes are tolled lanes that operate alongside existing untolled highway 
lanes. The goal is to provide motorists with faster, more reliable alternative lanes. In this 
case, there will be two new HOT lanes in each direction. Carpool vehicles (defined here 
as carrying three or more occupants), buses, motorcycles, and, of course, emergency 
vehicles will all have free HOT lane access. Vehicles with fewer than three occupants can 
choose to have access to the lanes by paying a toll. Importantly, dynamic tolling (that is, 
congestion pricing) will be used on the HOT lanes to ensure traffic remains free flowing at 
all times. Tolling will be fully electronic, using transponder technology.54 According to the 
Virginia Department of Transportation: 
The I-495 Virginia HOT Lanes Project will deliver the most significant 
enhancement to the beltway since its opening in 1964. The project includes 
two new lanes in each direction from the Springfield Interchange to just north 
of the Dulles Toll Road and the replacement of more than $260 million in aging 
infrastructure. This includes replacing more than 50 bridges, overpasses, and 
major interchanges.55
The Capital Beltway HOT lanes will be financed, built, and operated through a fixed-price, 
design-build PPP. In June 2002, the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) received 
an unsolicited proposal from Fluor Daniel to design, build, and finance Capital Beltway 
HOT lanes. The proposal was received through Virginia’s Public–Private Transportation 
Act of 1995, which allows private parties to enter into transportation PPP agreements with 
the state, and for unsolicited proposals. VDOT invited competing proposals, but none were 
received.56
A comprehensive development agreement was concluded in December 2007, under 
which a partnership of Fluor and Transurban will construct and operate the lanes, while 
VDOT will own and oversee them.57 Total concession life is 85 years, with five years of 
construction and 80 years of operation. Total project cost, estimated at $1.9 billion, will be 
financed using a mixture of sources, including private equity, private activity bonds, TIFIA 
loan financing, and a $409 million grant from the state. This is the largest financing of HOT 
lanes in the United States, and the first time private activity bonds will be used to help fund 
HOT lanes. Importantly, the project’s large cost and state fiscal constraints would likely 
have prevented it from moving forward without private investment.58
Texas state highway 130. Texas State Highway 130 is also known as Pickle Parkway 
(after former congressman J. J. “Jake” Pickle), or SH 130. It is a tollway that will, when 
completed, be 89 miles long and run in a corridor south and east of Austin.59 SH 130 was 
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constructed to help address the large increase in truck traffic between the United States 
and Mexico associated with the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), which came into force on January 1, 1994. It serves as an alternate route to 
I-35, which it parallels.60 
Lone Star Infrastructure, a partnership of civil engineering firms and large highway 
construction firms, was awarded a contract to build one major section of SH 130 in 2002. 
The first segment was opened to the public in November 2006. In June 2008, Cintra-
Zachry reached an agreement with the State of Texas to build segments five and six of 
SH 130. Cintra-Zachry will receive the right to collect tolls on those segments for 50 years 
in return for their investment of $1.3 billion. The agreement stipulates that toll rates will 
rise at the rate of inflation. Cintra-Zachry and the state will share toll revenue. Title to the 
road remains with the state. The concessionaire is responsible for designing, constructing, 
operating, maintaining and, importantly, financing the facility. As an indication of the 
capital-raising advantage of PPPs, a tax-exempt, debt-only approach using toll revenue 
bonds would have raised about $600 million, while a PPP was able to raise the entire $1.3 
billion using a combination of debt and equity.61 Like the Capital Beltway HOT Lanes, it is 
unlikely that the SH 130 project would have been built without private financing.62
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currenT liTeraTure on Public-PrivaTe 
ParTnershiPs
 
This chapter briefly surveys the current literature on PPPs before discussing the four 
key policy areas that are the focus of this study. As PPPs have risen in importance, the 
academic community has broadened and deepened understanding of many aspects of 
PPPs. Included are discussions extant research on the public decision-making process, 
public relations in PPPs, the use of PPPs in rail and aviation projects, the choice of 
concession length, and the perspective of investors in PPPs.
Several groups of researchers have examined the decision making processes and analytic 
tools that public agencies use when embarking on PPPs. Morallos and Amekudzi63 survey 
current practices for conducting value for money (VfM) analyses. They identify six key VfM 
drivers: risk transfer, output specifications, contract length, performance measurement and 
incentives, competition, and private sector management skills. Strength and weaknesses 
of different calculation methods are discussed. Buxbaum and Ortiz64 provide a thorough 
study of the decision making process involved in significant PPPs in the U.S., along with a 
useful history of PPPs. They discuss the advantages of PPPs for financing transportation 
infrastructure, with the caveat that the long-term implications are not widely understood 
and superior, as yet unexplored alternatives may exist. Important changes due to PPPs 
cited are the replacement of taxes with tolls, private equity versus private lending, and 
the private sector’s ability to bring about cost savings. Bonnafous and Jensen65 provide 
guidance for public agencies deciding which of several possible PPP projects to undertake. 
They show that correctly ranking projects to obtain the most efficient outcome may require 
sophisticated mathematical modeling. Such models take into account both the financial and 
socioeconomic aspects of the projects. In a similar vein, Tsamboulas et al.66 demonstrate 
how a hierarchical risk analysis can be used as a tool to help a public agency better 
understand the importance of different risks to potential private investors. They also show 
how it could be used to structure discussions during the negotiation of a PPP contract.
 
Public perception of PPPs has also been a concern, and several researchers have 
addressed this issue. Ward and Sussman67 studied toll road PPPs in Malaysia, where 
a lack of transparency and public participation in the PPP process has led to protests. 
They propose policies to address these problems and ensure the long-term viability of 
PPPs there. Lawther (2004) argues that attention must be paid to public outreach and 
marketing of new PPPs to encourage their use. Lawther68 uses three urban Advanced 
Traveler Information Systems (ATIS) as a case study, but the lessons can also be applied 
to physical infrastructure projects as well. Buxbaum and Ortiz69  also provide strategies for 
addressing public concerns about PPPs. 
PPPs have been used in contexts other than roadways, in particular in rail and aviation, and 
lessons can be learned from these projects as well. Risk allocation in urban rail PPPs was 
studied by Phang.70 Across urban rail PPPs in Latin America, Asia, and Europe, common 
tradeoffs that had to be addressed when formulating PPP contracts included technical 
knowledge versus PPP management knowledge in the government agency, the extent to 
which complementary services should be bundled into a single contract, and concession 
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length. In particular, longer concession lengths might enhance the ability of the government 
agency to develop a long term relationship with a vendor whereas shorter concession 
lengths allow more opportunities for competitive bidding. However, frequent bidding also 
may entail higher transaction costs simply because renegotiation occurs more often. Else 
and James71  perform a mathematical analysis of PPPs involving railways and show that in 
certain market structures, quality of service is likely to fall. This highlights the importance 
of explicitly incorporating service standards in the PPP contract. Majumdar and Ochieng72 
investigate the effects of PPPs on funding, new technology, project management, pricing, 
and customer service in the context of aviation navigation infrastructure. The discussion 
of these facets of PPPs is also relevant to surface transportation PPPs.
The optimal length of PPP concessions has been an active area of research. Albalate 
and Bel73 use a simulation study to compare flexible concession lengths with fixed-length 
concessions. Using data from two tollways in Spain, they show that a flexible concession 
length would have resulted in a shorter contract length (because of unexpected growth in 
demand), hence benefiting the users of the tollway. Vassallo74 discusses an approach to 
variable-length concessions taken in Chile, in which contractors bid on the least present 
value of the revenues (LPVR). The evolution of the LPVR approach in Chile is traced 
and it is compared with other common tactics to mitigate demand risk. Bel and Foote75 
compare recent PPP tollway projects in France and the U.S. They found that investors 
in the U.S. paid on the order of five times as much as did investors in France (relative to 
current cash flow). They identify aspects of the contracts and the bidding processes that 
may explain this difference. First, the concession lengths in the U.S. were longer and the 
maximum allowable toll was higher. Secondly, in the U.S. bid price was the sole factor 
used in determining the winning bid, whereas in France multiple criteria determine the 
winning bid. These factors impact the relative burden placed on users of the toll facility 
and taxpayers.
Understanding the perspective of potential investors is also important to a successful 
PPP. Brown,76 in a summary of recent growth trends of PPPs in the U.S., highlights the 
importance of tax benefits to the private partner due to depreciation of the infrastructure 
assets. An interplay exists between the contract length and the ability of the private 
partner to maximize their tax benefits. Debande77 reports on the UK’s experience with 
transportation infrastructure PPPs since the inception of the country’s Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) in 1992. A useful typology of relevant risks by project phase is provided, 
as is a discussion of several case studies. Vassallo and Sanchez-Solino78 describe the 
recent use in Spain of subordinated public participation loans (SPPL) as an instrument to 
facilitate the financing of toll facility PPPs. SPPLs are essentially loans originated by the 
public sector whose interest rate depends on the traffic level on the facility. Such loans 
can be used to encourage private participation through a more equitable sharing of risk. 
Although the authors find that SPPLs have been used successfully in Spain, they also 
propose possible improvements. 
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four Key PPP Policy issues
This chapter discusses the four policy issues that are the main focus of our study, and 
consider their importance for U.S. PPPs. To recap, those issues are: (1) how to distribute 
the risks inherent in PPP contracts across public and private sector partners; (2) when 
to use non-compete (or compensation) clauses in PPP contracts; (3) how to address 
concerns about monopoly power; and (4) the role and importance of concession length.79 
In each case, the authors first considered the importance of the issue, and how it is has 
been treated in the United States. They then discussed how it has been addressed in 
Australia. 
risK allocaTion in PPP conTracTs
The authors first consider an issue that many experts consider to be a critical aspect of 
PPPs: the allocation of risk between public and private partners. Scholars studying the 
interaction of economics and the law have long recognized that contracts play a key role 
in allocating the risk of any economic activity among the contracting parties. PPP contracts 
are no exception. One role of a PPP agreement is to determine how the risks inherent 
in a given transportation project will be distributed between the government—that is the 
citizens of the relevant jurisdiction—and the private partner.80 
Importantly, without some form of private participation, citizens will by default bear almost 
all the risks associated with financing, designing, constructing, operating and maintaining 
a transportation asset. The only substantial portion of project risk not borne by citizens is 
that assumed by municipal bondholders. 
First consider some of the main risks associated with a transportation project.81 There is 
agreement among analysts that some basic PPP risks include, but are not limited to:82 
Traffic or Revenue Risk• . Traffic, revenue, or demand risk may be the most important 
economic risk associated with the design and construction of a new transportation 
facility, that is, with a greenfield PPP. This is the risk that actual or realized traffic volume, 
and thus revenues, will be less than projected at the time the facility was planned and 
constructed. This risk is important because it could impact the private partner’s financial 
viability, and thus its ability to repay its debt. In many PPP agreements, the private 
partner receives its compensation through collection of facility toll revenue. The private 
partner thus assumes demand risk. This is consistent with basic principals of efficient 
risk allocation, since private investors are usually highly diversified, assume demand 
risk voluntarily, and are compensated for this type of risk assumption. Although it is 
rarely viewed as such, the risk of competing facility construction (normally addressed 
in the United States through non-compete clauses, as discussed below), is a subset 
of traffic or revenue risk, since a competing free facility may reduce traffic and thus 
revenues on the facility in question. 
cost overrun risk.•  This is the risk that the actual cost of a transportation project will 
exceed its expected cost. There are a variety of risks associated with completing a 
transport facility that may cause costs to rise, such as unexpected geological conditions, 
problems in design, and increases in the cost of materials. Cost overrun risk is more 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
Four Key PPP Policy Issues28
relevant for greenfields than for brownfields, although major existing facility expansion 
and refurbishment may also suffer from cost overruns. As in many countries, cost 
overruns have been a significant risk in Australian transportation projects, particularly 
under traditional procurement methods.83 
• 
Time overrun risk.•  This is the risk that a project will take longer to design and 
construct than expected. This risk is sometimes conflated with cost overrun risk. 
Although it is obviously related to cost overruns, it is a distinct risk, since it is possible 
for a project to be completed on budget, but later than expected, which carries a 
unique set of hazards. If a project is delayed, motorists will be denied the use of the 
facility during the time delay. Those are not necessarily hazards associated with cost 
overruns. 
maintenance and operation risk.•  These include maintenance costs that are 
higher than anticipated as well as operational failures. Operational risk is generally 
associated with the risk that road capacity might be unavailable. It includes roadway 
unavailability during winter due to snow and ice, as well as lack of availability due to 
staff management issues.
financial risk.•  This risk arises because the anticipated financing for the project might 
not materialize at the expected cost of finance. It includes not only risks associated 
with raising the necessary capital, but also exchange rate risks, interest rate risks, and 
insurance costs, among other sources. 
environmental risk. • This is the risk that the necessary environmental permits to 
construct the facility will not be forthcoming, and that costs associated with environmental 
mitigation will be higher than expected. This risk type is likely to be more important for 
a greenfield than for a brownfield PPP, although it is relevant for a major expansion of 
an existing facility.
regulatory and sovereign risk. • This risk includes the possibility that regulations will 
adversely affect facility profitability and thus value. If, for example, a facility is rate-of-
return regulated, this includes the possibility that tolls will not be increased adequately 
to allow the operator to realize a market rate of return on their investment. It can 
also include changes in planning and environmental requirements. An example of 
sovereign risk is the possibility that the public sponsor will decide to cancel the project 
after bidding has been completed or after construction has begun. Sovereign risk 
includes the possibility that the government might expropriate infrastructure assets. 
An example of sovereign risk in Australia is the February 2010 cancellation by the 
New South Wales government of the planned AUS$5.3 billion central business district 
metro rail line in Sydney after costly bids for the project had already been placed.84
land assembly risk.•  This is the risk that the large tracts of land required to complete 
a greenfield PPP will not be forthcoming. This is due to the problem of property owners 
“holding up” projects, or because of environmental issues. This risk is mitigated by 
the power of eminent domain in the United States, although not all PPP projects have 
relied on that power to assemble the necessary land. 
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force majeure risk. • This type of risk includes “acts of God” that are not under the 
direct control of either party. It includes such adverse events as earthquakes, wars, 
floods and tidal waves, among others.
The key question that must be addressed by the contracting parties is: which of these risks 
are best borne by investors and which by citizens in their capacity as transportation facility 
owners? There are two basic elements to risk management: who is best able to actually 
control the risks and who is best able to bear the remaining systematic risk via hedging 
and diversification. Investors may be better able to manage some risks while others are 
best borne by the public sector. The public partner may, for example, be better able to 
manage risks associated with sovereign, regulatory and environmental risks, whereas 
private partners may be better positioned to manage financial risks.
Although patterns are emerging, the contracting parties often determine the best allocation 
for the particular project at hand and given the prevailing capital market conditions. That is, 
the optimal risk allocation across parties may vary across projects, jurisdiction, and time. 
The public sponsor might assume greater risk (such as assuming demand risk through 
shadow tolls or availability payments) in some cases in order to attract private investment 
and to realize the numerous other benefits associated with private participation. Risk 
sharing does in fact appear to vary widely across projects.85 As noted, under exclusive 
government operation citizens assume almost the entire range of risks associated with 
facility design, construction, maintenance, expansion and operation. 
Risks transferred to the private sector are priced into the cost of the bid. The gains from 
risk sharing accrue from the fact that the private sector may be better at managing certain 
risks, so that the overall cost of risk management is reduced.86 The pricing of risk also 
helps to make the actual costs of risk more transparent. As one PPP expert states:
Society benefits if the market for risk bearing works effectively. Some parties 
exposed to particular risks will be willing to pay a large sum to have those risks 
transferred to others. Other parties may be able to bear, or take actions to mitigate, 
those risks at a low cost and are thus willing to take them in return for some lower 
sum. Insurance contracts are the classic case of such risk transfer (with benefits 
arising from pooling of risks by the insurer).87 
 
The type and degree of risk transfer remains one of the most important issues in PPPs. 
Next is a discussion of the allocation of risk in Australian PPPs. The authors combined 
the findings of two existing studies of risk allocation in Australian PPPs in Table 2. These 
studies identified several risks in addition to those noted above. 
Table 2 suggests that there is a broad range of risks that must be allocated via a PPP 
contract. The table might lead one to believe that risk transfer is static across time and 
projects. Australia has, however, been utilizing PPPs long enough that its basic approach 
to risk allocation has changed significantly over time. 
Several experts interviewed for this study pointed out that Australia has gone through at 
least three stages of risk allocation over the past 25 years. The first could be loosely called 
the Sydney Harbor Tunnel (SHT) stage, where the public sector essentially guaranteed 
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revenues and thus assumed the project’s demand/traffic/revenue risk. The SHT PPP has 
sometimes been criticized as a “giveaway” to private sector partners, mainly due to the 
public sector’s assumption of demand risk. It is notable that this PPP resulted from a 1985 
unsolicited proposal from a partnership of two transportation facility construction and 
operating companies, Transfield and Kumagai. That is, there was no large equity investor 
participation, so there were no residual claimants to act as risk bearers and actively seek 
risks for which they could be compensated.88 
After the SHT project, and perhaps in reaction to it, the pendulum appears to have swung 
in the opposite direction. The second phase could be called a “maximum risk transfer” 
approach, where public sponsors sought to transfer as much risk as possible to the private 
sector.89 
 risk allocation in australian PPPsTable 2
risk Type Public sector Private Partner
Market/Demand/Revenue X
Design X
Financing X
Environmental Compliance X
Construction X
Approvals Process Xa
Geotechnical X
Land Assembly X
Utility Relocation X
Operations and Maintenance X
Latent Defects X
Legislative Changes/Sovereign X
Native Title X
Force Majeure X
Competing Facilities Xb
a Often shared between the two parties. 
b Limited restrictions on public sector. 
Sources are Federal Highway Administration, Public-Private Partnerships for Highway Infrastructure, Table 6, p. 25; 
and Table 1 in Mick Lilley and Catherine DeGiorgio, “A Private-Sector Perspective,” Australian Accounting 
Review, July 2004: Vol. 14, no. 2, p. 35.
Public sponsors came to understand that there is no “free lunch” with regard to risk 
transfer in the sense that private partners will take the proposed risk transfer as given 
and will price risk assumption into competitive bids. If the private sector is, in fact, worse 
at assuming certain risks, then maximum risk transfer will increase the overall social cost 
of the project. There was also an understanding that a significant number of private sector 
financial failures stemming from excessive risk assumption under the PPP model was 
not in the long-run interest of present or future public sector partners. It is good for both if 
PPPs are viewed as successful overall.
The result was a move toward what some interviewees called “optimal risk transfer.” Here 
public and private participants seek to allocate risks to the party that is able to manage 
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them at least cost. This lowers the overall social risk assumption cost of the project.90 
Although risk assumption in this period differed across projects, patterns appeared to 
emerge, with private partners assuming traffic and cost change risk, while public sponsors 
assumed the risk of land assembly. This allocation appears largely consistent with Table 2. 
A study of PPPs in NSW, for example, noted the learning and the risk allocation on the M4 
and M5 projects in Sydney: “Positive attributes coming out of the M4 and M5 were that the 
operators accepted all patronage and cost escalation risk without recourse to Government, 
while the RTA (Roads and Traffic Authority) retained the risk of property acquisition and 
took interest rate risk up to a point.”91 
Although it may be too early to be termed a “stage,” there appears to be an emerging trend 
with regard to risk allocation since the global financial crisis (GFC) that began in 2007. 
The GFC had the effect of reducing significantly the amount of risk capital (both debt and 
equity) available globally for many investments, including transportation infrastructure. 
Overall, capital markets were less willing to assume risk. Interviewees noted that, in 
order to attract capital to PPP projects it became necessary for risk allocation to shift 
again, with public sponsors absorbing more demand risk through shadow toll/availability 
payments type approaches.92 Experts also noted the effects of increased competition for 
infrastructure-oriented capital from other regions, particularly in Asia (China and Korea 
were emphasized), where public sponsors are willing to assume demand risk. Although 
the study’s interviews reveal no definite consensus regarding whether or not demand risk 
is likely to be re-allocated to private partners in the future, once credit markets ease, some 
experts did state that they expect future Australian transportation PPPs to be availability-
payments based. Several also believe that the urban projects that could be easily funded 
via toll revenue were largely already exploited; there is little “low hanging fruit” left. Some 
also noted that the other social benefits of PPPs, such as moving projects forward in time, 
innovation in design and other aspects, and life-cycle costing justify continued use of the 
PPP model, and that its use was not threatened by shifting demand risk to the public 
sponsor. This is substantiated by the increasing reliance on the PPP model for social 
infrastructure, where the public sector always absorbs demand risk. Regarding credit 
markets, several experts stressed that the degree of financial leverage or “gearing” of 
projects via debt was likely to remain lower than during pre-GFC days for some time. 
This discussion suggests that the public sector can “dial in” the amount of risk it assumes in 
order to get projects completed. Such adjustability demonstrates one of the main benefits 
of the contracting approach—its inherent flexibility. 
Several interviewees stressed that for the risk-transfer social benefits of PPPs to be realized, 
demand risk must be truly transferred to the private partner. Suppose, for example, that a 
transport project is undertaken as a PPP where the private partner assumes demand risk, 
perhaps through a real toll project. If the private partner subsequently encounters financial 
difficulties due to inadequate demand, the public partner may then begin to subsidize the 
private partner to ensure its ongoing financial viability. In that case, the public sector is 
effectively assuming demand risk, thus defeating one of the key justifications for the PPP 
approach. These experts stressed that the public sector must be willing to allow the project 
to stand or fall on its own for risk to in fact be transferred.
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There are two Australian transport PPPs in Sydney where assumption of traffic risk proved 
to be pivotal: the Cross City Tunnel and the Lane Cove Tunnel. In both cases traffic forecasts 
for the first two years of operation proved to be optimistic. When the predicted traffic 
volumes did not materialize, the concessionaires faced financial difficulties. Consistent 
with the risk-transfer aspect of PPPs, equity holders largely absorbed those losses. Cross 
City Tunnel equity investors lost about 90 percent of their investment value, while the 
lending banks received their loans back in full.93 Lane Cove Tunnel equity investors were 
completely wiped out; the lenders’ situation is unclear as of this writing.94 These financial 
failures became fodder for the media and eventually political footballs. Although equity 
holders were impacted, losses did not accrue to the respective governments however. 
Indeed, in the case of the Cross City Tunnel, the government of NSW received an upfront 
payment of $96 million.95
Those failures have both costs and benefits for the PPP approach. While some members 
of the public and the media view these projects as repudiating the PPP approach, at 
least one interviewee noted that such financial losses serve to reinforce the point that 
the private sector in fact does assume substantial risk in a greenfield PPP, sating that, 
“After these high-profile financial failures, it is difficult to argue that toll-road PPPs are a 
‘giveaway’ to the private sector.”
The next section addresses the second key policy issue, which is the use of non-compete 
and compensation clauses.
non-comPeTe clauses anD comPensaTion clauses
A non-compete clause is a provision in a PPP contract that prohibits the public partner 
from constructing an unplanned government-supported transportation facility that would 
compete directly with the privately operated facility in question. The clause is intended to 
protect the private partner’s investment from competition from an unplanned competing 
facility. The issue of non-compete clauses was brought to the forefront of the U.S. PPP 
debate by the SR 91 Express Lanes in California, as discussed above, which is one 
reason this topic was chosen for study.
A less restrictive version of a non-compete clause has emerged both in the United States 
and abroad, called a compensation clause. In Australia such clauses are typically part 
of a broader “material adverse effect” clause, which allocates the risk of a range of 
potential adverse effects. In a compensation clause, the public partner may construct 
an unplanned competing facility but is required to compensate the private partner for 
revenues lost from the added competition. The Indiana Toll Road concession agreement 
for example requires the state to compensate the concessionaire for lost revenues if the 
state constructs, within 10 miles of the Indiana Toll Road, a new interstate-quality highway 
of 20 or more continuous miles.96
The economic rationale for such clauses is straightforward: both debt and equity investors 
will be loath to invest if they fear competition, and thus a loss of revenue, from a nearby 
government-supported facility. To borrow a term from another industry, if a large, unplanned, 
competing facility were installed, the facility in question might become a “stranded” asset. 
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Stranded assets are sunk investments on which it becomes impossible for a firm to earn 
an economic rate of return. Although that may happen in the normal course of economic 
activity, asset stranding is a concern when caused by an unanticipated regulatory change 
or other government action.97 
An example suggests that, historically, competition from nearby un-tolled government-
supported facilities has stranded toll facilities. On February 18, 1928, the U.S. Highway 
11 bridge across Lake Pontchartrain in Louisiana was opened to traffic.98 The toll bridge 
was built with private funds as a tolled facility by a group of contractors called the Watson-
Williams Syndicate. Governor Huey P. Long, who campaigned on the promise of “free” 
(meaning non-tolled) bridges, entered office soon after and built competing bridges at 
the Rigolets and Chef Menteur Pass. As a result, the Watson-Williams Bridge suffered a 
severe drop in revenue, became stranded, and its owners were eventually forced to sell 
the bridge to the State of Louisiana for pennies on the dollar. The effect on both equity and 
debt holders was ruinous.
Non-compete clauses originally evolved to assure buyers of toll revenue bonds (both 
private and government issued) that traffic would not be diverted from the toll road, thus 
reducing its ability to repay that debt.99 The holders of any type of bond who anticipate being 
paid back via a facility’s toll revenue are likely to demand guarantees against unplanned 
competing non-tolled roads.100 
One interviewee stressed the interaction of non-compete clauses and revenue sharing, 
noting that one major concern with non-compete clauses is governmental time inconsistency. 
The problem is that government may contractually commit in the contract to not construct a 
competing facility, and later renege on that agreement. If there is revenue sharing, however, 
then the public sector has an incentive to avoid the construction of competing facilities.
Although they are not always viewed as such in the United States, compensation clauses 
are another example of risk allocation through contracts. They attempt to address one type 
of event among many (the construction of a competing facility) that can affect the revenues 
accruing to a particular facility. 
Economic literature suggests that a particular risk should be borne by the party in the best 
position to manage it, as this lowers the overall cost of risk bearing. Because the decision 
to construct a competing facility lies with the public partner, efficient risk allocation appears 
to argue in favor of compensation clauses.101 However, in the United States concern has 
been expressed about compensation clauses because they may constrain future public 
sector decisions regarding capacity additions. A balance therefore must be struck between 
the need for a compensation clause to attract capital and the public sector’s need for 
flexibility in adding future capacity. 
Compensation clauses in the United States have been adjusted depending on the 
contractual setting. The Chicago Skyway agreement, for example, offers the concessionaire 
no protection against the construction of unplanned competing facilities. However, this 
may not reflect imprudent risk assumption by the concessionaire since dense urbanization 
near the Skyway makes competing facility construction costly. 
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Similarly, many new contracts to construct and operate managed lanes contain only 
limited protection against the development of competing facilities. For example, on the 
I-635 managed HOV Lanes Project in North Texas, which was approved by the U.S. 
Federal Highway Administration under the Express Lanes Demonstration Project (ELDP) 
in March of 2009, the scope of protection is limited to new main lanes within the project 
right of way. The concessionaire is thus offered no protection from the construction of new, 
reconfigured, or expanded, frontage roads. Similar limited protection arrangements obtain 
for the North Tarrant Express project in Texas and the I-495 Capital Beltway managed 
lanes projects in northern Virginia. Other U.S. PPP agreements, however, contain greater 
assurances of compensation for the effects of competing facilities. 
Compensation clauses in U.S. PPP contracts remain an important policy issue. The draft 
version of the Surface Transportation Authorization Act of 2009 released by the House 
of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in July 2009 contains 
provisions that would restrict the use of non-compete agreements. In particular, Section 
1301 (a)(3)(E) states:‘‘The public authority shall not enter into an agreement with a private 
person under which the State is prevented from improving or expanding the capacity 
of public roads in the same travel corridor.”102 Because of their importance in attracting 
both public and private investment while constraining public sector decisions, policies 
regarding compensation clauses should be considered carefully. 
Experts informed us that the trend in Australia is away from material adverse effect 
clauses that restrict the public sector, and toward greater assumption of competing-facility 
risk by the private sector. Increasing private sector risk assumption is consistent with the 
observation of some interviewees that a very high standard of proof must be met before a 
private operator will be compensated for a material adverse effect. The clauses are usually 
heavily qualified, and the standard for proving “materiality” is quite high, particularly in 
Sydney. Interviewees suggested that private sector partners thus place very little value 
on such clauses. 
Interviewees also noted that MAE clauses are becoming more standardized overall. 
Private bidders are expected to take the allocation of risks enumerated there as given, 
and price those factors into their bid. This is consistent with the view of several experts that 
public sponsors are more cognizant of the risks they are willing and unwilling to assume, 
such that risk allocation in PPP contracts is becoming more standardized overall. 
Several experts stressed the interaction of compensation clauses and “compensable 
enhancement clauses.” Conceptually, a new, nearby facility may either increase or 
decrease traffic flows on a PPP facility. A compensable enhancement clause is effectively 
the reverse of an MAE clause in that the public sponsor will be compensated for the effect 
of facilities that increase the private partner’s revenues. If, for example, the government 
builds an unplanned new road that feeds traffic to the PPP facility, that may be a 
compensable enhancement. The amount owed to a private partner via a compensation 
clause can thus be offset by a compensable enhancement. In this way, there is effectively 
a ledger of payments kept between compensations and compensable enhancements. 
For example, on the EastLink facility in Melbourne, if the operator, ConnectEast, can 
prove that there was a material adverse effect, they can only be compensated if there is 
an off-setting compensable enhancement to draw from. 
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aDDressing PoTenTial marKeT PoWer 
Another critical public policy concern addressed through a PPP contract is the control of 
market power potentially possessed by a private participant. This is a concern to economists 
because the high prices that may result from monopoly result in a misallocation of resources, 
with too little of the good or service in question begin produced or consumed. In some 
industries, elaborate, costly regulatory structures have evolved to address market power. 
Economists have criticized some regulatory approaches as being themselves misguided 
and inefficient, so it is important to consider approaches to controlling monopoly power 
carefully within the transportation context.  
In any market, pricing power stems from the lack of available substitutes for the good 
or service in question. In the vast majority of markets, such as bread, gasoline, cars or 
houses, there are several viable alternatives for the product offered by any one company, 
so prices are constrained by competition within the market itself. 
From an economic perspective, it is important to keep prices in check not because doing 
so constrains companies’ profits or because it prevents “price gouging,” however defined. 
Rather, it is important because consumers will then purchase the correct (that is, the 
economically efficient) amount of bread, gasoline, cars and houses. If suppliers face limited 
competition, they would be able to raise prices to a level that would cause consumers to 
purchase an inefficiently small amount of the good or service, and society would lose as 
a result. Public policy should thus focus on the quantity of the good or service produced 
and consumed. 
In the transportation context, market power results in a toll road operator charging such 
a high toll that too few customers—in this case motorists—choose to use the facility. This 
is a concern regardless of whether the operator is public or private. An inefficiently small 
number of motorists end up using the road, bridge or tunnel. Again, the focus is not on 
price (here, the toll), or on the operator’s profits, but rather on what quantity (here, traffic 
volume) is most socially desirable.103 
Traffic flows possess some unusual economic attributes, however. For most goods, a 
higher price will reduce the quantity consumed, all else equal. For a congested transport 
facility, such as a highway, a toll that increases with traffic flows will help reduce congestion, 
smooth traffic flow, and increase facility throughput. Therefore, high tolls themselves are 
not necessarily a sign of market power abuse. Rather, they may simply reflect effective 
use of congestion pricing. Market power only becomes a concern when higher tolls work 
to decrease, rather than increase, facility throughput. 
There are two main ways in which public sponsors using PPPs can constrain market 
power. The first is at the bidding stage, where the public sector can inject competition 
through a wisely structured tendering process. The second is through contract clauses 
that limit the rate at which tolls can be increased over time. We first discuss constraining 
market power by limiting tolls.
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Toll regulation via Price caps
One insight from the policy literature is that toll regulation should be viewed as a substitute 
for within-market competition. If a facility faces sufficient competition from other roads and 
modes, then toll regulation is unnecessary. If a facility operator attempted to raise tolls in 
such a case, then motorists would switch to other alternatives, and traffic volume (and thus 
facility revenue) would quickly fall. The available alternative routes affect how sensitive 
traffic volume is to toll changes—that is, the elasticity of demand for the facility in question. 
More alternative routes and modes increases demand elasticity. If demand elasticity is 
very high (and much traffic is lost when tolls increase), then even an unconstrained facility 
operator will not find it in their interest to raise tolls.
The intensity of competition from other roads and modes is likely to vary greatly across 
transportation facilities. This has important implications for the stringency of toll regulation, 
which should, if properly administered, vary inversely with the degree of competition. 
Given that the purpose of regulation is to mimic within-market competition (and thus to 
generate the benefits of competition, such as reduced costs and enhanced innovation), toll 
regulation should be relaxed as competition rises. Since optimal toll regulation is likely to 
vary across facilities, a one-size-fits-all approach may be undesirable. Rather, regulation 
of market power in transportation through contracts is best determined on a case-by-
case basis after careful consideration by public sponsors. An individualized outcome is 
likely to be achieved through facility-based negotiations and bidding. Of course, for many 
transportation facilities competition from other roads and modes may be weak and thus 
insufficient to keep tolls in check.104 In such cases, toll regulation is very important.
 
Consistent with practice in some other industries, caps on the tolls private participants 
are allowed to charge have become the dominant form of PPP regulation internationally. 
In general, price cap regulation simply limits the prices charged by the regulated firm, 
but there are several possible permutations. The price could be fixed at one level, which 
means that the toll in real terms falls over time. More commonly, however, the price cap 
is allowed to rise with some broad inflation index, such as the consumer price index. 
The important aspect of price cap regulation is that the firm’s incentives to innovate and 
contain costs are retained while monopoly power is controlled.105  
A second insight is that toll regulation in the PPP contract should focus on how the price 
or toll charged impacts traffic volume, since that is what affects economic efficiency.106 
Although most PPP contracts include some form of toll regulation, approaches focusing 
on traffic volume itself have been used in PPP regulation. For example, the concession 
contract for the 407 Express Toll Route in Canada allows the private operator (the 
Spanish firm Cintra) to set tolls as it wishes, but assesses penalties on the firm if it fails to 
attract adequate traffic from un-tolled roads that parallel 407.107 This obviously constrains 
Cintra’s ability to raise tolls to a level that would restrict traffic flows, but still allows it to use 
congestion pricing and also creates an incentive to expand the facility as necessary. 
A key question is the degree to which toll caps interfere with a firm’s ability to implement 
congestion prices. Tolls that are high enough to effectively regulate traffic flow may violate 
the cap. One solution is to impose a cap on the average toll over some time period (for 
example, over a week or a month), which allows tolls to exceed the cap within that time 
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frame if there are compensating low tolls during off-peak times. Notably, congestion tolls 
that must be very high to effectively regulate traffic are a reflection of the fact that facility 
supply has failed to adequately respond to increased demand over time. 
This relates to another important issue mentioned by several interviewees: having several 
PPPs in an urban setting that rely on price caps may interfere with the public sector’s ability 
to implement network pricing in the future. This is a concern in Sydney where several 
long-term PPPs relying on price caps are in use, and renegotiating the contracts to allow 
congestion pricing is likely to be costly. Several interviewees suggested that public sponsors 
try to anticipate the need for future congestion and network pricing when negotiating PPP 
contracts for urban areas. In addition to price caps written into the contract, market power 
can also be addressed through franchise bidding, which is discussed below. 
franchise bidding to address market Power
One important advantage of the PPP approach over traditional procurement is that PPPs 
create competition for the right to design, build, and operate a transportation facility. 
Competition here occurs at the stage of bidding for a concession or design and construction 
contract, rather than continuously over time, as when competition occurs within a market. 
When properly structured, bidding for the right to serve a market can convey many of the 
advantages of competition within a market. Franchise bidding can be structured to take 
place along different dimensions. It could, for example, take place on the basis of the 
lowest toll acceptable to the concessionaire with a pre-set lease term and specified service 
quality standards.108 If a sufficient number of firms bid for the right to serve a particular 
market, then bidding will cause the toll to be bid down to the per-unit cost of providing the 
good or service, as in a competitive market.109 
A second advantage of franchise bidding is that it can achieve productive efficiency. That 
is, the winning bidder will be able to produce the output (facility design, construction and 
operation, for example) at the least possible cost. If another firm were more cost-efficient, 
it would be able to under-bid its competitors and still receive a market rate of return on its 
capital.
Public sponsors can structure the bidding depending on what they wish to achieve. If the 
goal is to deliver a facility of a specified quality while charging the least possible toll, then 
bidding should take place on the basis of the lowest proposed toll schedule over time. 
Alternatively, in either a greenfield or brownfield context, if the goal is to maximize an up-
front payment then bidding could be on the basis of the largest concession fee given a 
pre-specified toll schedule and service quality level. Conversely, if a subsidy is required to 
operate the road, then bidding can take place on the basis of the lowest subsidy acceptable 
to the concessionaire. Some bids in Spain have been conducted on this basis.
Another innovative option is for bidding to take place on the basis of the smallest net present 
value of revenue given the toll schedule, with the concession re-bid when that present 
value is received by the concessionaire. This type of bidding has been recommended by 
several scholars, and has been used in Chile.110 
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addressing monopoly Power in australia
The authors next examine how monopoly power concerns have been addressed in 
Australia. Regarding the type of regulatory regime, perhaps the most striking insight from 
the interviews with Australian experts is the contrast between the importance economists 
place on it and the lack of concern coming from policy makers. All three Australian states 
rely on a simple price cap approach where the public sponsor sets the rate at which the 
toll can increase over time, although the rate of toll increase has been a bid variable in 
several cases. Experts simply noted that toll caps are applied in most cases and moved 
on. Several noted that CPI caps have the advantage of being politically appealing and 
are easily understood by the public. In no case did an expert suggest that toll caps were 
inadequate to the task of controlling monopoly power or that some other approach was 
better. Indeed, two interviewees noted the problems created by a rate-of-return regulatory 
approach in PPPs and highlighted how they blunt salutary incentives. This gave them 
confidence that toll caps are an appropriate way of addressing market power concerns in 
transport PPPs.
The use of bidding to inject competition proved to be a more interesting interview topic. 
The states differ as to which and how many elements are subject to bid. In New South 
Wales, for example, the government specifies the initial toll rate and then uses indexing 
to determine toll escalation. In Victoria and Queensland, the initial toll rate has also been 
a bid variable, but the government sets the tolling structure over time.111 
Interviewees representing different aspects of the transport sector stressed the importance 
of encouraging competition in the bidding process at all times. They suggested that it 
is best to define the full agreement carefully in advance and to then keep the bidding 
process going. In the words of one, it is wise to “keep the competitive pressure up as long 
as possible,” as this extracts the maximum benefit from competitive forces.
Certain aspects of the bidding process in Australia are noteworthy. Both Victoria and 
Queensland opted to form temporary public agencies for the sole purpose of procuring 
and commissioning highway PPP projects. The goal is to staff those agencies with people 
who are experienced in the PPP process. This focused expertise is itself likely to help 
ensure the efficiency and competitiveness of the procurement process. This also reflects 
recognition of the fact that the PPP contracting process is complex, and benefits from 
knowledge and experience. The creation of special agencies is also consistent with the 
comments of several interviewees, who stressed that public sector expertise is critical in 
structuring projects that are in the public’s interest.
The bidding process is similar across states. Prior to any actual bidding, governments 
conduct intensive study of the need for particular projects. Once a project passes an initial 
feasibility study, it moves to the “business case” stage. The business case is developed in 
accordance with the relevant government’s procurement guidelines. The business case 
for the project considers alternative delivery options (for example, PPP versus a traditional 
procurement approach) for the project, and identifies the option that is likely to provide 
citizens with the most “value for money.” 112
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Since PPPs create competition both between the traditional and the PPP approach, as well 
as competition among private providers (all of which helps to control monopoly power), it is 
useful to consider the meaning of value for money since this has become an integral part 
of the process. The FHWA study of PPPs reported that: 
...the basic drivers of VfM in New South Wales and Victoria are virtually identical:
improved risk management ● : This involves more rigorous risk evaluation and 
transfer to the private sector of those risks it is best able to manage, including those 
associated with providing specified services, asset ownership, and whole-of-life 
asset management.
ownership and Whole-of-life costing:  ● Efficiency is improved as design 
and construction become fully integrated upfront with operations and asset 
management. 
single Point of contact: ●  Ongoing service delivery, operational, maintenance, 
and refurbishment costs become a single party’s responsibility for the length of the 
contract period.
innovation: ●  This involves wider opportunities and incentives for innovative solutions 
to deliver service requirements. Opportunities may include: (1) bundled services 
through a package deal for all non-core services, (2) upgrades of associated and 
complementary infrastructure, and (3) packaged information systems.
asset utilization: ●  This includes reducing costs to the government, as a sole user, 
through more efficient design to meet performance specifications (that is, service 
delivery) and creation of complementary opportunities to generate revenue from 
others’ use of the asset.
Whole-of-government outcomes:  ● These include non-asset and non-price 
related, value-added outcomes of wider interest to the government, for example, 
socioeconomic and environmental outcomes.
In practice, Queensland has followed similar logic.113
Once analysts have determined that the project will in fact create value for money 
if delivered as a PPP, the next step is to begin the procurement process. The three 
Australian states all utilize a multistage competitive procurement process. The first stage 
is an invitation for expressions of interest (EOI). Once expressions of interest have been 
received, then a “short list” of acceptable participants is developed. The government then 
issues the request for proposals (RFP). The RFP typically includes: (1) comprehensive 
information about the issuing public agency, project objectives, and key stakeholders; (2) a 
description of the proposed payments mechanism and service delivery requirements; (3) a 
proposed construction completion date and design requirements; (4) proposed contractual 
arrangements and risk allocation; and (5) a description of the evaluation and selection 
processes to follow. 
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The government then receives proposals from the short-listed groups. It meets with 
those groups and conducts negotiations.114 A preferred bidder is then selected after final 
proposals are evaluated against predetermined criteria. The financial close occurs once 
contracts are finalized. Although states request a conforming proposal, there is latitude 
for the private sector to introduce new ideas and concepts. This process ensures that 
citizens benefit from PPP-induced competition. Depending on how bidding is structured, 
competition at the bidding stage will either drive up the amount of the concession payment, 
or drive down the concession term and/or the toll rate.
The Australian procurement process raises interesting questions regarding the theory 
and practice of PPPs. Different variables are subject to bidding in different PPPs. It is not 
well understood if increasing the number of bid variables tends to increase or decrease 
the competitiveness of the PPP process. One can imagine a large number of bid variables 
might make comparison across proposals more difficult. 
Interviews with Australian experts, however, suggest that the toll level and the concession 
term are now the primary bid variables, with lower tolls and shorter concession terms being 
preferred. While concession length is a simple, straightforward variable to compare across 
concessionaires, comparing toll structures across bids can be a complex task, particularly 
for large projects (such as CityLink) that have multiple sections. The toll structure may 
involve different per-mile rates on various sections, various peak rates, as well as a cap 
on the total trip cost, among other complications. Given these considerations, it appears 
best to keep the number of variables subject to bidding to a relatively small set. This 
allows for an “apples to apples” comparison across bidders. 
In sum, the consensus across experts is that price (toll) caps combined with competitive 
bidding are an effective way of addressing market power in PPP contracts. Experts suggest 
that toll caps are easy to understand, and are preferable to rate-of-return regulation. The 
actual bidding process is in more of a state of flux, but appears to be evolving toward a 
model where there are standard clauses, and private participants price those provisions 
into their bids in a competitive process.  
concession lengTh in PPP conTracTs
PPP concession length has become a prominent policy issue in the U.S. PPP debate. That 
appears to be a reaction to two brownfield PPPs featuring long concession lengths. Those 
include a 99-year concession on the Chicago Skyway and the Pocahontas Parkway, and 
a 75-year lease on the Indiana Toll Road. As with other policy variables, longer concession 
length has both costs and benefits. On the benefit side, longer concessions allow more 
capital to be raised on a given project since they provide more assurance that a market 
return on capital will be achieved. This is likely to be particularly important for greenfield 
projects incurring losses during many early years that must be made up through profits 
in later years. 
Longer concession lengths can also be beneficial in attracting private investment because 
of favorable tax treatment. For example, if the concession length exceeds the facility’s 
remaining design life, then the concessionaire can be treated as the facility owner for 
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tax purposes. That allows the concessionaire to benefit from accelerated depreciation. 
In particular, a highway can depreciate the share of its upfront payment allocated to 
tangible physical assets over 15 years rather than for the full lease term. Such favorable 
tax treatment will also help attract private participants. Longer concession length is also 
beneficial in that the often-substantial transaction costs of completing a PPP agreement 
are spread out over a longer term. Re-bidding costs are reduced.
There are also important costs associated with longer concession lengths. A longer 
concession reduces public sector flexibility since it locks both parties into a contractual 
arrangement for a longer period of time. This is a concern not only because of the effects 
of compensation clauses but also if contracts restrict the use of congestion pricing. Also, a 
longer concession implies that the concession will be less frequently re-bid, so the salutary 
effects of competitive bidding will be less frequently realized. 
Concession length also relates to the need to modify (or “rebalance”) contracts over the 
life of the concession. Rebalancing can take many forms, and contracts can be modified 
in either party’s favor. Some countries have found it useful to make small contractual 
modifications as the need arises rather than infrequent but large contractual renegotiations. 
This regularizes the interactions between the contracting parties and is likely to reduce the 
cost of contract modification. The term “rebalancing” is appropriate since it suggests the 
gradual modification that was observed in many Australian contractual relationships. The 
concession deed that governs CityLink in Melbourne, for example, has been amended 
29 times. One expert informed us that about half of those changes represent serious 
renegotiations.
Australian PPP concession lengths are notable for their variability. The concession length 
on the Sydney Harbor Tunnel was 35 years, with 5 years of construction. The M2 was 45 
years, and 35 years for CityLink. EastLink is 39 years. Peninsula Link will be 25 years. The 
concession term for the AirportLink/Northern Busway project is 45 years. 
Australian PPP concession lengths are also notable for the creative ways in which they 
are used. On the EastLink PPP, for example, concession length was a bid variable. The 
concession lengths of major Australian toll roads are listed in Table 3 below. 
 concession lengths of major australian Toll roadsTable 3
Project cost concession length
M2 Motorway $650 mill. 45 years
Melbourne CityLink      $2 bill. 35 years
Eastern Distributor $525 mill. 48 years
Cross City Tunnel $680 mill. 30 years
Westlink M7   $1.5 bill. 34 years
Lane Cove Tunnel      $1 bill. 33 years
Eastlink (Mitcham-Frankston Freeway)   $2.5 bill. 39 years
AirportLink/Northern Busway 45 years
Source: Christine Brown, “Financing Transport Infrastructure: For Whom the Road Tolls,” Australian Economic Review 
(2005) vol. 38, no. 4, Table 1, p. 432.
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Concession length in Australia is used as a policy tool in several ways. In written work, one 
expert notes that PPP concession length is set so as to cover costs, including those of debt 
and equity, stating, “The length of the concession period is determined on the basis that 
the sales of the asset-based services are sufficient to discharge construction, financing, 
operation and maintenance costs plus a reasonable profit for private investors.”116 Others 
note that the concession term often includes the construction period, which gives the 
concessionaire an incentive to complete the project more quickly.117 Concession length 
is also sometimes used as compensation for the concessionaire in the case of revenue 
loss from a competing facility. That is, the concession can be lengthened in response to 
revenue loss. 
The use of concession length in creative ways is consistent with practice in other countries. 
The FHWA scanning study of Australia, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom also 
emphasized that concession length is used to incentivize concessionaires to achieve 
their key performance indicators.118 Longer concession length is used to reward the 
concessionaire for superior performance, similar to its use to compensate for a material 
adverse effect: “In some cases if the PPP contractor maintains or exceeds the level of 
performance specified for the majority of the contract term, the contract period is extended 
by a predetermined number of years. In this case, the incentive is back-loaded.”119
Concession length could presumably also be shortened to impose a penalty, but the 
authors did not find examples of that approach.
Australian states rebalance contracts as necessary, and have established processes for 
implementing both major and minor contractual changes to the contract.120 Numerous 
interviewees noted the importance of managing the relationships over the life of the contract 
(often simply called “managing the contract”), and confronting and rebalancing issues as 
they arise rather than waiting until very large contractual changes become necessary. 
Overall, the need for rebalancing has not resulted in wholesale contract breakdown.  
This speaks to the importance of planning for a long-term relationship via a PPP. Indeed, 
given the ability to rebalance, some interviewees suggested that contracting parties should 
specify fewer detailed terms ex ante in the contract, while allowing more to be taken up 
through ex post rebalancing as they arise. Many stressed that such ongoing interaction 
helps to build trust and makes future negotiations proceed more smoothly.
In this regard, interviewees, particularly from the private sector, also noted the value 
of having a tasked public agency to manage the contract throughout its life. This 
offers the private partner a clear point of contact with which it can discuss contractual 
changes. Private partners benefit from such clarity because many facility changes, such 
as refurbishments and expansions. are value-improving. Private partners thus want to 
undertake them. Experts noted that those improvements were difficult to negotiate, even 
if value enhancing, if the government was not actively managing the contract. 
Several interviewees also stressed that the specialized government agency should have 
a mandate to maximize the facility’s social value, which is (assuming that monopoly 
power is properly controlled) consistent with the private partner’s for-profit incentive, and 
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consistent with motorists’ interests. That is, both entities should strive to maximize the 
facility’s use by motorists (that is, throughput), and to improve its quality and safety. 
Information provided by interviewees on the four policy issues discussed above was 
invaluable. However, the authors encouraged experts to explore what additional PPP 
issues they thought were important.  The following chapter discusses these issues.
 upfront Payments and revenue sharing in four australian PPPsTable 4
 
Project upfront payment
realized revenue
 (% of base case)
government’s share 
(% above base case)
Westlink M7 $194 mill.
< 105
105–110
110–120
120–130
> 130
  0
10
15
20
25
Cross City Tunnel $97 mill.
< 110
110–120
120–130
130–140
140–150
> 150
  0
10
20
30
40
50
Lane Cove Tunnel $79 mill.
< 110
110-120
120-130
130-140
140-150
> 150
  0
10
20
30
40
50
Melbourne EastLink $0
< 105
105-110
110-115
115-125
125-135
135-145
145-155
155-180
180-205
> 205
  0
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
60
70
Source: Christine Brown, “Financing Transport Infrastructure: For Whom the Road Tolls,” Australian Economic Review 
(2005) Vol. 38, No. 4, Table 3, p. 435.
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PPP Performance anD Public accePTance of PPPs in 
ausTralia
One key issue is the perceived economic performance of transport PPPs, or the value they 
create for citizens and motorists. Interviewees were mostly positive on this score. Several 
noted that the refinement of PPP processes over time has increased the social value 
generated by PPPs, and the public has responded positively. Many emphasized that PPPs 
have allowed large, complex transport projects to be delivered sooner, and have facilitated 
innovation. Several noted that motorists would have waited years or decades for projects 
to be delivered under traditional procurement. 
Others emphasized that PPP use has also improved the certainty of project delivery, so 
that estimates of project cost and time were more reliable.121 Available data are consistent 
with that conclusion. Table 5 below reports the on-time delivery performance of Australian 
transport PPPs, displaying the actual delivery date relative to the scheduled opening. As 
indicated, the total project delivery time saved on these projects is almost 4.5 years in New 
South Wales alone.
 on-Time Performance of highway PPPs in new south Wales, australiaTable 5
Project opened scheduled opening Time saved
M4 May 1992 February 1993 9 months
M5 August 1992 February 1994 18 months
Sydney Harbour Tunnel August 1992 August 1992 On Time
M2 May 1997 November 1997 6 months
Eastern Distributor December 1999 August 2000 8 months
Cross-City Tunnel August 2005 October 2005 2 months
Westlink M7 December 2005 August 2006 8 months
Lane Cove Tunnel March 2007 May 2007 2 months
Total Time saved 53 months
Source: Federal Highway Administration, Table 10, p. 47. “Schedule Performance of Highway PPPs in New South 
Wales.” Sydney is the major metropolitan area in New South Wales.
Interviewees indicated that the public is accepting of the PPP approach generally, which 
includes transport as well as social infrastructure projects. Several noted that, while there 
was significant media coverage of the use of a PPP in the past, that attention appears to 
have diminished over time. Their interpretation is that PPPs have become so commonplace 
in Australia that the media no longer considers them news unless the PPP is a financial 
failure. Experts also suggested that the evolution of policies and procedures to analyze 
and implement PPPs has reduced public skepticism about them over time.122 
Interviewees noted that the financial difficulties of some Australian transport PPPs (including 
the Cross City Tunnel and the Lane Cove Tunnel) generated concern about them, but that 
once those examples played out without significant effects on either motorists or on the 
government, concern dissipated. Traffic on the Lane Cove Tunnel, for example, was low 
enough that two key equity investors were forced to write the value of their investment 
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down to zero. Cheung Kong Infrastructure (CKI), which is controlled by Li Ka Shing, 
Hong Kong’s richest businessmen, wrote down the value of its 19 percent stake ($113 
million), to zero.123 The public appears to understand that equity holders absorbed that 
risk (as was appropriate) and that despite those problems motorists nevertheless now 
have access to new infrastructure. 
Although many interviewees stressed that overall the Australian experience with transport 
PPPs has been positive, several cautionary lessons were also stressed. The authors 
summarized these issues in the “don’ts” section of the Executive Summary, and elaborate 
on them in the following chapter.
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cauTionary lessons from The ausTralian PPP 
eXPerience
In this chapter, the authors discuss issues that policy makers should approach with caution 
when using PPPs.
flexibility to use congestion Pricing. Several interviewees noted that PPPs not 
contemplating congestion pricing in the original contract can make its subsequent 
implementation difficult. This is becoming an issue in New South Wales, where a number 
of PPPs have been used to complete roads ringing Sydney. With the minor exception of an 
additional dollar charge to use the Sydney Harbor Bridge during peak hours, these facilities 
are not congestion priced, and the original contacts did not include provisions allowing it. 
This may not have been a concern when the contracts were signed, but more analysts 
now recognize congestion pricing as a valuable tool for managing Sydney’s increasing 
traffic congestion. 
Implementing congestion pricing would require the government to negotiate its use with 
a number of concessionaires, and to coordinate its use across facilities that interact.
Interviewees viewed such renegotiations as “difficult but not impossible.” The cautionary 
lesson is not that PPPs should not be used, but rather that contracts, particularly when 
facilities are likely to interact as a network, should contemplate congestion pricing as a 
policy option. 
The importance of Public relations. Several experts stressed the importance of ongoing 
public relations in ensuring PPP success. They noted that, although the public should be 
involved and informed at every stage, public relations is particularly important immediately 
prior to and during the opening of a new PPP facility. The public and private sponsors 
should inform customers of the PPP opening, and of the benefits of the facility in terms of 
time savings. Many facilities have utilized a “toll free period” directly after opening and then 
applied tolls over time. Indeed, one expert referred to potential negative public relations 
surrounding a PPP as “media risk,” which must be carefully managed like other risks.
A vignette illustrates the importance of public relations efforts. The Cross City Tunnel (CCT) 
in Sydney is a 2.1-kilometer east-west tunnel that runs under Sydney’s central business 
district. One important goal of the tunnel was to reduce traffic on surface streets in the 
central business district. The PPP contract thus envisioned closure of certain streets once 
the CCT was complete. When the CCT opened and those streets began to close, however, 
the public viewed street closures as “funneling” traffic into the tolled tunnel and off of free 
streets, which caused a backlash against government authorities. Some experts suggested 
that a more intensive public relations campaign that focused on informing the public of the 
original reasons for planning street closure prior to tunnel opening, and generally “bringing 
the public along” during the process, would have enhanced understanding and mitigated 
backlash. Indeed, the authors were struck by how frequently the Cross City Tunnel surface 
street closures were mentioned by experts as negatively affecting the public perception of 
PPPs.
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Maximization of Up-Front Payments in Greenfield Concessions. Several experts 
stated that the bidding structure in some NSW greenfield concessions also generated 
public concern. The consortium in the Cross City Tunnel, the CrossCity Motorway, for 
example, paid the government of NSW AUS$100 million as a concession fee. The 
negotiations were concluded in 2002. Motorists came to view large concession fees as 
coming at the expense of higher tolls. Public concern was heightened when this was 
combined with surface street closures. Experts were uniformly opposed further use of this 
bidding approach, and did not believe that bidding that included a large up-front payment 
would occur again.
optimal Degree of Transparency. A salient issue in some Australian PPPs has been 
disclosure or, conversely, how much information is withheld from the public due to 
commercial confidentiality. This has become a concern in the construction of the Southern 
Cross Station in Melbourne, which is a PPP. In that case, some documents related to the 
station’s construction are to be withheld from the public until 2058.124
There is an economic case for holding some information in confidence during the bidding 
process. That is when the release of commercial information would result in too little effort 
or investment on the part of potential bidders, or when release would reveal trade secrets. 
Bidding on PPP contracts in Australia is costly, and if one bidder can “free ride” off of the 
efforts of another bidder by copying their efforts before the winner is chosen, it may do 
so. The end result is that fewer bidders will incur the high cost of submitting bids if there 
is free riding, and the overall PPP process will be less competitive. Careful attention to 
confidentiality should be paid in cases where free riding is possible.
However, keeping the details of contracts confidential beyond such situations is likely 
to fan public distrust of the PPP process, and may facilitate contracts that are not in the 
public interest. It is wise to disclose the terms of the PPP contracts wherever possible, 
and to inform the public of what decisions were made and why. 
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biDDing Process anD TransacTion cosTs
To recap, all three Australian states follow a similar approach with regard to bidding. They 
begin with an invitation for expressions of interest. A short list is generated from those 
expressions. The government follows with a detailed request for proposals. The process 
allows for both conforming and non-conforming proposals. Nonconforming proposals are 
viewed as facilitating the injection of fresh concepts and approaches into the provision of 
transportation services. 
Several interviewees suggested that it might be useful to rethink the PPP bidding process. 
Their main concern is that bidding costs under this approach can be very high, with private 
consortia incurring costs of between $10 and $20 million to simply assemble a bid. That is 
much higher than in other PPP-active countries, such as Spain. Experts believe that this 
high cost discourages potential bidders, and places pressure on private partners to be 
overly aggressive in bidding in order to recoup those costs. One interviewee suggested an 
alternative that would lower bidding costs is to conduct a first stage where relatively simple 
bids are entered, and the government would then put the best team together by choosing 
amongst those preliminary bids. Here the government effectively chooses the winning 
consortia. Others suggested subsidizing the cost of bidding, and increased standardization, 
as ways to lower bidding costs.
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summary of lessons anD concluDing remarKs
This chapter briefly summarizes the study’s findings pertaining to the four policy issues 
that have been prominent in the United States: (1) how to distribute the risks inherent in 
PPP contracts across public and private sector partners; (2) when to use non-compete (or 
compensation) clauses in PPP contracts; (3) how to address concerns about monopoly 
power; and (4) the role and importance of concession length.
This chapter concludes with a list of additional lessons learned from Australia beyond the 
scope of these four policy issues.
The Australian experience suggests that the public sector can “dial in” the amount of risk 
it assumes in order to get projects completed and adapt to changing financial conditions. 
Australia has gone through at least three stages of risk allocation. Most recently, after 
the global financial crisis, capital markets have been less willing to assume risk and so 
public sponsors have been absorbing more demand risk through shadow toll/availability 
payments type approaches. Even once credit markets ease, some experts expect future 
Australian transportation PPPs to be availability-payments based.
In terms of compensation clauses, the trend in Australia is away from material adverse 
effect clauses that restrict the public sector, and toward greater assumption of competing 
facility risk by the private sector. Interviewees noted that MAE clauses themselves are 
becoming more standardized overall. Private bidders are expected to take the allocation 
of risk enumerated there as a given, and price those factors into their bid. “Compensable 
enhancement clauses” have also been used and interact with MAE clauses.
 
Regarding the type of regulatory regime, perhaps the most striking insight from our 
interviews with Australian experts is the contrast between the importance economists 
place on it and the lack of concern coming from policy makers. All three Australian states 
rely on a simple price cap approach where the public sponsor sets the rate at which the 
toll can increase over time, usually tied to the CPI. The use of bidding to inject competition 
was more diverse. Different variables are subject to bidding in different PPPs, though as 
the use of PPPs has evolved in Australia the toll level and concession term are now the 
primary bid variables.
 
Australian PPP concession lengths are notable for their variability and the creative 
ways in which they are used. Concession lengths ranged from 25 to 45 years. Several 
interviewees noted that when the construction period is included in the concession term, the 
concessionaire is motivated to complete the project more quickly. Numerous interviewees 
noted the importance of managing the relationships over the life of the contract (often 
simply called “managing the contract”), and confronting and rebalancing issues as they 
arise rather than waiting until very large contractual changes become necessary.
Australia now has over 25 years of experience with the basic PPP approach to providing 
transport services. Its methods have been refined over time, a process that is in only its 
earliest stages in the United States. It is thus useful to highlight several areas where the 
authors believe Australia’s best practice diverges from that in the United States. These 
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insights and lessons are distilled from the study’s in-depth interviews. Some U.S. states 
may have adopted these practices to a greater or lesser degree, but the authors believe 
that these are key points on which policy might wish to focus. 
The importance of Public sector expertise. One key lesson is the importance 
of developing expertise in the PPP process. PPP contracts are complex, long-term 
commitments that should be entered into carefully. It is important that a state have a 
tasked group of public officials who can quickly develop and retain PPP expertise. Public 
sponsors should also seek all necessary outside advice to ensure that PPP contracts 
are in customers’ and taxpayers’ best interest. Throughout the interviews, the authors 
encountered dedicated public officials who have developed considerable expertise in this 
area.
The creation of special Purpose government entities. Consistent with heavy 
reliance on public sector expertise, Australian states regularly create special purpose 
entities to negotiate complex transport PPP contracts. This helps ensure that the contract 
preserves the public interest. There are also several public bodies which promote and 
provide information about private investment in infrastructure. For example, the state of 
Victoria created Partnerships Victoria in 2000 which “provides the framework for a whole-
of-government approach to the provision of public infrastructure and related ancillary 
services through public-private partnerships.” In 2008 the Commonwealth government 
created Infrastructure Australia for this role. This is consistent with Australia’s emphasis 
on both promoting PPPs and on developing expertise in this area. 
The importance of managing the contract over its life. An insight repeated by both 
public and private sector interviewees was the need to manage the contract over time. 
That is, the public sector should not view a PPP contractual close as being the end of its 
responsibilities. Instead, social welfare from a PPP is enhanced by having an ongoing, 
clear point of contact for private partners to consult with. A simple example is the addition 
of a lane to an existing facility, which both increases the social value of the facility as well 
as revenue to the operator. 
using concession length as a strategic Policy Tool. Concession length was used 
in several innovative ways in Australian PPPs. For example, concession length can be 
a bid variable, where shorter concession lengths are preferable. Concessions can also 
be lengthened as compensation for reduced revenues from an unplanned competing 
facility. 
emphasizing Public relations. Australian states have recognized the importance of 
keeping the public informed. This includes information on the reasons for the PPP and for 
transport changes surrounding it, such as the surface street closures associated with the 
Cross City Tunnel PPP. Moreover, transparency of contractual details enhances public 
trust. Unless there is a compelling economic reason, the details of PPP contracts should 
be transparent. 
ensuring that PPP contracts accommodate congestion Pricing, Particularly 
in urban settings. Numerous experts mentioned the challenges ahead for NSW in 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
 Summary of Lessons and Concluding Remarks 53
implementing congestion pricing around Sydney, since the contracts for the several PPPs 
forming the Sydney ring road did not contemplate congestion pricing. Renegotiating 
contracts to allow coordinated use of congestion pricing is likely to be difficult. Interviewees 
thus recommended that new PPP contracts include congestion pricing provisions.
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aPPenDiX a: vehicle-miles TraveleD anD lane miles 
in The u.s.
Source: Virginie Raphael, Public-Private Partnerships: Can the United States Learn from the French Experience to 
Address its Highway Funding Needs? Tufts University Master of Arts Thesis (April 2007, p. 13). Available at: 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/research/2007/Raphael.pdf., accessed August 5, 2009.
vehicle-miles Traveled and lane miles in the united states: 1980 to 2005figure 1 
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aPPenDiX b: lisT of inTervieWees
Academia and Non-profit
Colin Duffield, associate professor, Engineering Project Management, Department of • 
Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Melbourne
Henry Ergas, Australian economist and columnist for • The Australian
David Henscher, professor of management and founding director of the Institute of • 
Transport and Logistics Studies, University of Sydney
Michael Porter, director of research and policy, Committee for Economic Development • 
of Australia
Private sector
Wendy Adam, National Traffic and Transport Planning executive, Parsons Brickerhoff• 
Linda Bardo-Nicholls, former chair, • Australia Post
Robert Bartlett, commercial affairs manager, CityLink, Transurban• 
Megan Fletcher, group general manager, public affairs, Transurban• 
Tomas Nohel, senior consultant, project development & procurement, GHD• 
David Rolland, manager, Melbourne, GHD Meyrick• 
Richard Warwick, manager, transportation, GHD• 
Public sector
Stephen Alchin, executive director, infrastructure planning, Infrastructure Australia• 
Rory Brennan, Infrastructure Australia• 
George Brown, Department of Planning, Government of Western Australia• 
Laure Darcy, senior private sector development expert, Asian Development Bank• 
Matthew Dunn, Treasury Department, New South Wales• 
Jennifer Gordon, principal adviser research, Productivity Commission Government of • 
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Australia
Paul Hubbard, Australian Treasury Department• 
Peter Kain, Australian government, Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional • 
Economics
Glenn Maguire, executive director, Partnerships Victoria, Department of Treasury and • 
Finance, Victoria
Lyn Martin, Australian government, Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional • 
Economics (retired)
Phil Potterton, Australian government, executive director, Bureau of Infrastructure, • 
Transport and Regional Economics
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aPPenDiX c: inTervieW quesTions on ausTralian 
PPPs
Name: _______________________________
Affiliation: ____________________________
Questions about the bidding process:
Is competitive bidding or negotiation used more frequently to complete a P3 in your  ●
State?
If competitive bidding is used, what variables are set by contract and which are  ●
determined by bidding?
Are unsolicited P3 proposals allowed? ●
Questions about the structure of PPP contracts:
Can you give me the essence of the material adverse effect clause?  ●
Have the MAE clauses been more or less restrictive of the public sector over time?  ●
Who is assuming the most risk?
How is monopoly power controlled? If through CPI caps, then how is the initial toll  ●
level set? Via Bidding?
How is contractual compliance monitored in you State? Is there a government body  ●
that constantly oversees compliance?
Has there been renegotiation of P3 contracts? If so, how does the renegotiation  ●
process take place?
Do P3 contracts contain termination for convenience clauses? Is the buy-back price  ●
market price?
Do any PPPs in your State include revenue-sharing provisions? Are there any  ●
upfront concession fee payments? 
How is the contract length, or duration, determined in P3s in your State? Is it ever  ●
a bid variable?
How does your State deal with low-income groups/those with few travel options on  ●
P3 toll facilities?
Are there any hand-back provisions at the end of the BOOT contract? ●
Questions about tolling:
Are there any shadow toll or availability projects in Australia? If not, are shadow tolls  ●
or availability payments likely to be used in the future in Australia or will all projects 
be real toll?
Do toll caps interfere with a private operator’s ability to congestion price? How is  ●
this conflict resolved? 
Is the use of congestion pricing likely to increase in the future? ●
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General Questions: What is the role of the Commonwealth Government regarding 
PPPs in your State, if any? 
Would you say the PPP approach is generally accepted by the public? Is acceptance  ●
of PPPs by the public is improving or not?
What do you think has been the most important benefit of including private  ●
investment? Risk transfer? Faster project delivery? Innovation? Other?
In your view, what is the most significant difficulty associated with the use of  ●
PPPs?
Please add any additional information you would like to convey regarding the lessons 
the United States can learn from the Australian experience with transportation PPPs. 
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aPPenDiX D: sTaTe-level summary of PPPs in 
ausTralia
In this appendix, the authors provide additional detail on the use of PPPs in three key 
Australian states: New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland. These three were chosen 
because they have the most experience with PPP use, as shown in Table 1 on page 16. 
neW souTh Wales (nsW) 
NSW has a population of about 7 million, which makes it the largest state by population. 
About 4.3 million reside in Sydney, NSW’s main urban center. NWS has over 12,427 miles 
of regional and local roads, and state highways. 
NSW began its PPP activity in the early 1990s out of a desire to implement road pricing 
and in response to governmental budgetary constraints. Reflecting the severity of its 
budgetary problems, the NSW government enacted the 1995 General Government Debt 
Elimination Act, which constrained the State’s use of debt. Additional motives for exploring 
PPPs included faster project delivery and the ability to transfer risk to private investors.127 
Regarding PPP administration, there are two relevant government entities in NSW. The 
Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) has oversight of both the highway and the PPP program.128 
The Office of Infrastructure Management in NSW is responsible for implementing the 
State Infrastructure Strategy, which is a rolling 10-year plan not limited to transportation 
infrastructure.
Highway PPPs in NSW (mainly in and around Sydney) are real-toll projects (as opposed 
to shadow tolls or availability payments).129 The NSW government typically determines 
the initial level of toll —or puts the initial level out for bids—and then uses CPI indexing 
for increases over time. NSW uses the PPP approach intensively. Eight of the 11 toll road 
projects in Australia have taken place in New South Wales, which are:
The Sydney Harbour Tunnel (SHT)• 
The Eastern Distributor• 
The Hills M2 Motorway• 
The M4 Motorway• 
The M5 South-West Motorway• 
The Westlink M7• 
The Cross City Tunnel• 
The Lane Cove Tunnel• 
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The authors discuss several of those projects in detail to provide a flavor for transport 
PPPs in NSW.
The sydney harbor Tunnel. The bulk of PPPs in NSW have been used in and around 
Sydney. NSW’s first PPP, and the one that is generally credited with initiating PPP use in 
Australia, is the Sydney Harbor Tunnel. This PPP resulted from a 1985 unsolicited proposal 
from a partnership of two transportation facility construction and operating companies, 
Transfield and Kumagai. Since the proposal was unsolicited, it was not subject to either 
competitive tendering or a market test (both of which are now required in Australia). The 
project is also unusual in that it was governed by its own legislation, which is the Sydney 
Harbor Tunnel (Private Joint Venture) Act 1987. Such an act was necessary because the 
NSW government did not have a PPP policy apparatus in place at that time, and appears 
to have been caught somewhat off guard by this proposal. 
The State agreed that a tunnel was the best approach to addressing the heavy congestion 
that had developed on the Sydney Harbor Bridge in the mid-1980s. That congestion 
constrained the amount of traffic that could flow between North Sydney and the Central 
Business District.130 The NSW government, however, did not have sufficient resources to 
finance such a large and complex project. 
Construction on the Tunnel began in 1987. It went into service in 1992 and cost $749 
million to complete. It is 1.4 miles long, and features two lanes in each direction. It was 
built under a build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) agreement with the NSW government. 
The contract length is 35 years, five of which were spent in construction. At the end of 
the operating period, in 2022, the Tunnel will become an asset of the NSW government. 
It is noteworthy that the BOOT arrangement implies that title to the facility rests with the 
private partner. Actual asset ownership was important for the private partner since it was 
then able to claim depreciation for tax purposes as well as more secure collateral for 
financing. 
Revenue risk allocation is another unusual aspect of the Tunnel project. Unlike subsequent 
Australian transportation PPPs, the public sponsor assumed substantial revenue risk. The 
government of NSW assumed traffic risk by guaranteeing a specified minimum revenue. 
The NSW Roads and Traffic Authority thus made periodic, predefined payments to the 
private partner. It also assumed certain financing and default risks. The main risk assumed 
by the private partner was construction risk, which was important since geotechnical 
problems arose during tunnel construction. Some analysts believe that this allocation of 
risk was driven by the financial market’s inexperience with and thus apprehension about 
PPPs in these early stages.131 
Similarly, the private parties in this case were contractors who did not have the balance 
sheet capacity of large banks or access to other types of equity. The Sydney Harbor 
Tunnel was consequently entirely debt funded, so investors were naturally more risk 
averse than equity investors who might have been willing to absorb revenue risk in return 
for higher potential returns. There simply were no equity holders to assume such important 
economic risks. Without the participation of equity holders to serve in their critical role of 
providing risk-bearing services, traffic risk had to be assumed entirely by government.
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Experts have noted the change in risk allocation over time. As the NSW Treasury states: 
The nature of financing PPPs in NSW has changed dramatically since the 
construction of the SHT. Early economic infrastructure PPPs were primarily driven by 
contractors and tended to lack the type of consortium structures seen today—that is, 
there was not necessarily an investment bank directly involved, or other third parties 
contributing equity.132 
The SHT project is a useful example of how financing structures and risk assumption 
interact: if developed financing structures exist, then more project risk can be placed on 
private partners. It also speaks to the underdeveloped nature of infrastructure capital 
markets at that time. The SHT example is also informative as it illustrates how risk sharing 
is a variable that can be adjusted depending on capital market constraints. When risk 
capital is relatively scarce, the public sponsor can assume more economic risk in order to 
attract private investment. 
The Sydney Harbor Tunnel PPP is also important because it inspired NSW to develop 
new policies and procedures governing the use of private participation in transportation 
infrastructure. Many experts believe that the development of those policies and procedures 
were themselves very helpful in facilitating Australia’s PPP activity. Some commentators 
date the inception of the Australian infrastructure market from 1988, when NSW established 
such policies.133
The hills m2 motorway. Another important PPP in NSW is the Hills M2 Motorway. The Hills 
M2 is a 21km motorway linking the lower north shore of Sydney with Sydney’s northwest 
regions. It opened to traffic in May 1997, and is now a critical part of Sydney’s beltway road 
network. It provides a link between the Lane Cove Tunnel and Westlink M7. The Hills M2 
is now owned and managed by Transurban, which acquired it in 2005. The M2 includes 
electronic express lanes to improve traffic flows. Transurban has a concession to operate 
the M2 under a 45-year contract until 2042. After that time ownership of the M2 transfers 
to the government at no cost.
The M2 is of interest from a policy perspective. It is a real-toll build-own-operate-transfer 
(BOOT) PPP where the private partner bears traffic risk. Unlike the SHT, the public partner 
makes no direct payments or guarantees to the private partner. After an examination of 
project risk, the Auditor-General of New South Wales concluded that, “the M2 contractual 
arrangements had soundly transferred and valued the project’s risk. The M2 contract and 
financial structure was used as a model for the CityLink project in Melbourne, Australia’s 
first fully electronic toll road.”134 Instead of receiving payments, the private operator is 
required to pay “land rents” to the public sector for the right to levy a toll. This is not a 
payment for leasing the land, but is instead actually a charge for the right to levy tolls. The 
payment is, however, contingent on the concessionaire earning a pre-defined minimum 
rate of return.135 Notably, this approach is similar to the revenue-sharing approach used on 
the SH130 in Texas. 
The cross city Tunnel. The Cross City Tunnel (CCT) is probably Sydney’s most contentious 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
Appendix D: State-Level Summary of PPPs in Australia64
PPP. The CCT is a 2.1 km tunnel running east to west in Sydney. It links Darling Harbor 
to the Central Business District. It bypasses 16 sets of traffic lights westbound and 18 
eastbound, carving 20 minutes off travel time.
The concept behind the tunnel was to encourage traffic to bypass Sydney’s central 
business district, which would reduce surface traffic. This would hopefully make that area 
more conducive to public transport, cyclists, and pedestrians. In 2002 Cross City Motorway 
(CCM) Pty Ltd was awarded a DBFO contract to build, own and operate a tunnel under 
Sydney’s central business district. The contract offered CCM no recourse to the NSW 
government if traffic volume failed to materialize. The concessionaire also bears both 
design and construction risks.
One innovation in the CCT contract award process was how the winning contractor was 
chosen. A competitive bidding process was held. Bidders were asked to bid on the basis 
of the size of a “business consideration fee” (BCF) payable to the NSW government. As on 
the M2 Motorway, the business consideration fee is a fee paid to government for the right to 
levy tolls. CCM was chosen because it offered the highest up-front payment. That payment 
was $96.8 million, of which $54 million went to reimburse the NSW Roads and Traffic 
Authority for its costs related to the project, and $46.1 million was a BCF component.136 
This is consistent with one key goal of the project, which was to build the tunnel at no net 
cost to the government. 
The CCT is actually two distinct tunnels, depending on whether traffic is eastbound or 
westbound. Each tunnel accommodates two lanes of traffic. The CCT is Sydney’s first 
completely electronic tollway, and requires the motorist to have an electronic tolling tag. 
The tunnel required $680 million in both debt and equity financing. The CCT is privately 
owned and operated, and will revert to public ownership in 2030.
The tunnel was officially opened on August 28, 2005. Early tunnel usage was however 
less than expected, and in November of 2006 it was reported that the CCT was in financial 
difficulties. In December 2006, Cross City Motorways was placed in receivership. On Juhe 
20, 2007,  Leighton Contractors and investment bank ABN AMRO were designated as 
preferred purchasers of the Cross City Tunnel Group. The tunnel was purchased for $700 
million in what was effectively a greenfield PPP.
Although there are many more PPP projects in NSW, these three hopefully provide a sense 
of their structure.
vicToria
Victoria is situated in the southeastern section of Australia. Over 70 percent of its population 
of 5.34 million people lives in its largest urban area (and Australia’s second-largest city), 
Melbourne. Victoria has more than 13,670 miles of rural and metropolitan arterial roads. 
The PPP process in Victoria appears to be the result of detailed long-term planning. There 
are two main transport PPPs in Victoria: CityLink and EastLink. Victoria had studied the 
need for those projects for over 40 years.137 Although these PPP’s account for less than 
1 percent of Victoria’s overall road network, they are complex, critical facilities in dense 
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urban settings. Victoria created temporary public agencies for the purpose of administering 
each of its PPPs. The creation of such agencies is viewed by experts as having contributed 
to the success of those projects. 
 
citylink. CityLink is a north-south set of roads that helps provide a connection between 
Melbourne’s airport, its ports, and its central business district. It offers connections between 
three existing freeways in Melbourne (Monash, Tullamarine, and West gate). It is 14 miles 
(22KM) long, and is notable for being Australia’s first fully automated tollway. It has no toll 
plazas, toll booths, or coin chutes. Construction began in 1996, and the road was opened to 
traffic in August 1999. CityLink has two distinct sections: the southern and the western links. 
The Western Link connects the Tullamarine Freeway to the West Gate Freeway, while the 
Southern Link connects the West Gate Freeway to the Monash freeway. 
CityLink was designed and constructed at a cost of $2.2 billion. It was financed with $510 
million in equity and $1.3 billion of debt. As with many other Australian PPPs, it was built 
under a build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) contract, where design and construction was 
undertaken by a joint venture between Transfield and the Japanese company Obayashi 
Corporation, under contract to Transurban. It is 100 percent owned and operated by 
Transurban. The concessionaire was responsible for arranging financing and construction, 
and is responsible for operating and maintaining CityLink. At the end of the 35-year concession 
period, in January 2034, CityLink is to be transferred to the government. However, some 
experts suggest that the government is likely to re-bid the concession in a brownfield PPP 
rather than absorb the ongoing costs of maintenance and expansion. This view applies not 
only to CityLink but to other concessions that are to expire in the near future, such as the 
M4 Motorway in Sydney.
Major difficulties were encountered during the construction of CityLink, which required major 
tunneling and significant elevated construction. Despite these difficulties, the project has 
been an overall financial and political success. It provides improved mobility to the area, and 
was completed at almost no cost to the taxpayer.138
Early in the process, the State of Victoria decided that an independent authority would handle 
project development. It therefore established the Melbourne City Link Authority in December 
1994. The Authority evaluated submissions for completion of the project, negotiated with 
interested parties, and recommended the entity that should complete the work. The Authority 
was also responsible for ensuring that the project was completed in accordance with the 
Melbourne City Link Act of 1995, and acquired the land necessary for the project. It was 
disbanded in February 2002. Ongoing responsibility for managing contractual relationships 
is now vested in VicRoads, Victoria’s roads authority. Interestingly, there is a cap of $6.30 
on the overall trip cost on CityLink. That is, no matter how much of CityLink a motorist uses, 
they know that the total cost will never exceed $6.30.
eastlink. Eastlink is Victoria’s largest PPP to date. It is a north-south highway on the 
eastern side of Melbourne. It cost $2.4 billion and is 25 miles long. It opened to traffic five 
months ahead of schedule, in June 2008, and is fully electronic. It is very complex, featuring 
two three-lane mile-long tunnels, 17 interchanges, and 88 bridges. There are 25 miles of 
shared-use recreational pathways. The project also features attractive, innovative sound 
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walls, public art, and pedestrian walkways. Interestingly, it has also achieved a net gain in 
native vegetation.
The structure of bidding for the EastLink concession is of policy interest, since several 
variables were bid variables. Both the toll rate and the initial toll structure (across the various 
component parts) were bid variables. The rate of toll increase is capped at the CPI. The 
concession contract included revenue sharing, with revenues in excess of those forecast 
shared with the government. The contract also mandates that any financial benefits of 
refinancing be shared with the public partner. Concession length was also a bid variable. 
There were clearly defined performance criteria for design, quality, safety, engineering, 
and other project aspects. In particular, both the Request for Proposals (RFP) and the 
concession contract specified key performance indicators (KPIs) in four target areas:
customer service• 
maintenance• 
landscape and environment• 
tolling accuracy• 
Notably, any penalties arising from failure to meet KPIs are payable directly into the accounts 
of motorists who hold Eastlink’s electronic tags.139
In October 2004, ConnectEast, a publicly traded company, was awarded the PPP contract 
to finance, design, construct, own and operate Eastlink. The agreed-upon concession 
length was 39 years.140 Regarding non-compete clauses, there were no restrictions on road 
improvements, but any work deemed proximate (such as that connecting to or within the 
vicinity of the project) could entitle the concessionaire to compensation.141 So the relevant 
clause is effectively a compensation clause.
queenslanD
Queensland is situated in the northeast section of Australia. Its population is about 4,380,000. 
Two transport PPPs have been used thus far in Brisbane, which is Queensland’s main urban 
center. Because Queensland was relatively late in using PPPs in Australia, it was able to 
benefit from knowledge and experience developed in other Australian states, particularly 
Victoria and NSW. Indeed, Queensland employed knowledgeable personnel from other 
states in its PPP procurement process. Both of Queensland’s PPPs are currently under 
construction. In both cases, the initial toll rate was a bid variable, but the government sets 
the tolling structure over time by limiting increases to the consumer price index.
The first PPP in Queensland was the North-South Bypass Tunnel, which is now called the 
M7 Clem Jones Tunnel (CLEM7) in honor of a former Brisbane lord mayor. The Brisbane 
Municipal Council sought this contract, since it wanted to provide an additional crossing over 
the Brisbane River. It is a 7km, $3.2 billion toll road to be built underground between and 
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Woolloongabba and Bowen Hills in Brisbane. The CLEM7 will be Brisbane’s first privately 
financed toll road, and one of Queensland’s largest infrastructure projects. Tolling will be 
electronic. Up to 100,000 vehicles are expected to use the tunnel each day. Construction 
began in September 2006, and the official projected opening date is October 2010. 
The second PPP in Queensland is the combined Airport Link/Northern Busway project, 
which is a complex $4.6 billion project that runs between the airport and downtown 
Brisbane. AirportLink will be a mostly underground toll road connecting Brisbane’s northern 
suburbs with the airports and the inner city. It will actually be composed of two tunnels (one 
northbound and one southbound). The Northern Busway will be a two-lane, two-way, bus-
only roadway connecting Windsor to Kedron and other suburbs. The Windsor to Kedron 
section of the Busway will be delivered by AirportLink, which will separate buses from 
general traffic. 
As with several other PPP procurements in Australia, Queensland established a wholly 
state-government owned company to manage the procurement of the Airport Link/Northern 
Busway project, called the City North Infrastructure Pty Ltd (CNI). CNI is responsible for all 
land acquisitions required for the Airport Link/Northern Busway projects. CNI essentially 
handles the project from start to finish, including the business case, environmental 
assessment, procurement, contract management, and eventually handover. It considers 
itself to be a “Special Purpose Vehicle” that acts autonomously.142
On May 19, 2008, the Queensland government announced that BrisConnections was the 
preferred bidder for both projects. BrisConnections is a partnership of Macquarie Capital 
Group, Theiss and John Holland. The concession length is 45 years. BrisConnections is 
required to finance, design, construct, commission, operate and maintain the projects. 
Financial close was achieved on July 30, 2008. Construction commenced in 2009, and the 
project is due for completion in mid-2012. The combined project cost is over $4 billion, with 
AirportLink costing about $ 3.4 billion and the busway about $444 million. 
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ATIS Advanced Traveler Information Systems
BOO Build-Own-Operate
BOOT Build-Own-Operate-Transfer
BOT Build-Operate-Transfer
BTO Build-Transfer-Operate
Caltrans California Department of Transportation
CCR Companhia de Concessões Rodoviárias
CCT Cross City Tunnel
CKI Cheung Kong Infrastructure
CLEM7 M7 Clem Jones Tunnel
CNI City North Infrastructure Pty Ltd
CPI Consumer Pricing Index
CPTC California Private Transportation Company
DB Design-Build
DBB Design-Bid-Build
DBFO Design-Build-Finance-Operate
DBOM Design-Build-Operate-Maintain
ELDP Express Lanes Demonstration Project 
EOI Expressions of Interest
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GFC Global Financial Crisis
HOT High-Occupancy Toll (lanes)
ITRCC Indiana Toll Road Concession Company
KPIs Key Performance Indicators
LPVR Least Present Value of the Revenues
LTL Long-Term Lease
MAE Material Adverse Effect
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NSW New South Wales
OCTA Orange County Transportation Authority
PFI Private Finance Initiative
PPP Public-Private Partnerships
RFP Request for Proposals
RTA Roads and Traffic Authority
SCC Skyway Concession Company LLC
SHT Sydney Harbor Tunnel
SPPL Subordinated Public Participation Loans
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TIFIA Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 1998
TRIP II Toll Road Investors Partnership II
VDOT Virginia Department of Transportation
VfM Value for Money
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